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Thailand is centrally located relative to the Avian Influenza epidemic 
and her response to the disease has important implications for 
disease control efforts both regionally and globally.  A middle-
income country with a large and economically significant export-
oriented poultry sector, Thailand has made protection of the broiler 
industry and preservation of international market access the 
primary focus of her response.  At the same time, policy-makers 
have needed to assuage small-scale poultry producers, including 
cockfighting enthusiasts, who have borne the brunt of movement 
controls and stricter biosecurity standards.  Consequently, the 
government has re-evaluated its absolute ban on livestock 
vaccination and implemented innovative strategies such as “bird 
passports” to reduce the burden of compliance on small producers.  
Another significant dimension of the Thai epidemic is the recent 
emergence of open-grazing duck production, which may have 
provided a reservoir and vector for the H5N1 virus.  Niche producers, 
including duck farmers, carry increasing weight in political and 
economic spheres in Thailand.  Finally, the Thai public health 
community has advocated for more aggressive measures to prevent 
additional animal-to-human transmission of disease.  The human 
health dimensions of the Avian Influenza epidemic have ultimately 
strengthened Thailand’s position in the international health debate 
and resulted in increased funding for infrastructure development 
and capacity-building. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The rapid and widespread propagation of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) through the 
poultry (and on a much smaller and slower scale, human) population in Thailand was significant 
not only in national but also international terms, owing both to the geographic, political and 
technological centrality of Thailand in the Southeast Asian region (itself, in turn, the epicenter of 
the global epidemic), and to the country’s prominent position (fourth internationally in terms of 
both value and volume) in the international poultry trade.  For these reasons, an understanding 
of the dynamics of the Thai HPAI epidemic and the measures taken to bring it under control are 
of interest to an audience much larger than just those focused on issues of livestock production 
and/or emergent (human) disease threats in this part of the world.  In addition, the history of the 
HPAI epidemic in Thailand and the response at both the local and national levels provide an 
interesting and informative vantage point to those seeking a nuanced understanding of 
contemporary political, social and economic forces within Thai society, as many of the fissure 
points which were visible in the debates on HPAI and its control are, in fact, reflective of the 
sweeping changes taking place in the Thai economy and Thai politics.  This article will attempt 
both to describe the important features of the epidemic from a disease control perspective and 
to explain their significance ethnographically.  While this two-sided focus will inevitably mean 
that there are aspects of each narrative that are given short shrift or treated too extensively for 
the needs of specific audiences, it is hoped that in general the article provides a sufficiently 
comprehensive overview of the epidemic’s development and the government’s response so as 
to be of benefit to technical advisors, policy-makers and scholars of the epidemic. 
 
The story of HPAI in Thailand is intertwined with other significant narratives.  The epidemic, 
which had its onset in late 2002 or early 2003, came on the heels of the Asian economic crisis, 
which had sent the baht into free-fall, displaced tens of thousands of workers and undermined 
confidence in the country’s financial management. It was also a time when the political system 
was in transition.  The 2000/2001 elections had ushered in a populist government, headed by 
Thaksin Shinawatra, a telecommunications tycoon who was strongly oriented towards the needs 
of the business community.  Thaksin’s ascent, and the forces which propelled it, signaled a 
realignment in the balance of power between rural areas and the Bangkok metropolis, and 
between new commercial interests and the established political elite.  Finally, of more proximate 
interest to this analysis, the early 21
st
 century was a period of sweeping changes in Thailand’s 
poultry sector.  The sector, which only twenty years earlier had been an insignificant contributor 
to national accounts, was, at the time of the epidemic’s outbreak, among the country’s top-
twenty sources of export earnings, with large industrial producers – a class which had not even 
existed two decades earlier – now supplying close to 10% of the world poultry export market.  
The arrival of HPAI both shaped and accelerated changes going on in the poultry sector and, 
perhaps, changes going on in the country more generally, just as these secular trends affected 
the speed and manner in which the Thai government responded to the crisis.  
 
To elucidate the role which not only the commercial poultry sector but also other interests 
played in shaping the national debate on HPAI, this article will analyze the epidemic from the 
perspective of four major stakeholder groups: industrialized poultry producers, cock-fighting 
enthusiasts, duck farmers, and (human) health professionals (in particular members of the public 
health community).  Each of these groups played a central role in shaping the government’s 
perceptions of and responses to the epidemic, and each furthermore represents a slightly 
different window on Thai society and the Thai economy, as a whole. 
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Industrial poultry producers, whose interests held more sway in the Thai government’s response 
to HPAI than those of any other group, are in many respects representative of the “modern 
sector” of the Thai economy and, more specifically, of export-oriented agribusinesses, which 
have come to play a key role in Thailand’s economic growth.  Technologically sophisticated and 
increasingly self-contained in terms of their production process, these firms were well 
positioned to attend to the bio-physical dimensions of disease control internally (at least in 
terms of their own facilities).  However, they were dependent on the government to manage the 
disease control efforts beyond their gates and sought its assistance in shaping (for the better) 
perceptions of the HPAI situation among consumers, both domestically and internationally.  As 
such, these politically well-connected entrepreneurs exerted a strong influence on the technical 
management of the epidemic and on the way in which information about the epidemic was 
released. 
 
Cock-fighting enthusiasts, including both those who rear and train the birds directly and those 
who attend matches and/or wager on their outcomes, might be seen (and consciously 
positioned themselves in this debate) as the “everyman” in the Thai political landscape.  They 
came to serve as proxies for the vast rural population, whose more traditional approaches to 
animal husbandry and economic survival, more generally, were felt to be under siege as larger 
commercial interests came to dominate agricultural production.  Not to be overlooked in this 
equation is the fact that the rural electorate provided the largest and most consistent basis of 
support for Prime Minister Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party. 
 
Duck farmers had seldom, if ever, been regarded as a distinct agricultural subpopulation and 
would not have entered the government’s radar on this issue (nor this author’s) had it not been 
for epidemiological evidence which strongly implicated free-ranging ducks in the conservation 
and transmission of the H5N1 virus.  This led to the promulgation of a set of specialized policies 
and support mechanisms and also illuminated the existence of an emergent class of specialized 
“niche” producers, who may represent an important trend in Thai agriculture as the sector 
becomes more sophisticated and diversified. 
 
Finally, the public health community, which encompasses health educators, health 
policymakers, and pharmaceutical interests, as well as persons directly involved in the 
administration and provision of health services, represents the interest group which is most 
orthogonally positioned relative to the others.  The human health implications of the spread of 
H5N1, which clearly defined the epidemic in the mind of the international community (including 
many of the international actors who provided assistance to or funding for Thai initiatives), 
played a less central but nevertheless important role in the way in which the Thai public and Thai 
policymakers regarded the disease.  Prevention of human cases was, in fact, the “gold standard” 
by which the success of the overall disease containment effort was judged.  That said, the 
interests of the public health community in the HPAI epidemic went far beyond the immediate 
concern for disease control, extending into issues of technical capacity-building, organizational 
restructuring and the legitimation and promotion of Thai science on the international stage.  
 
In terms of the organization of this paper, the various thematic analyses outlined above will be 
preceded by a brief overview of the context of the epidemic and a short history of key events and 
followed by some concluding comments.  A description of the process by which the information 
on which this report is based was obtained is contained in a methodological appendix (Appendix 
A), which describes both the author’s approach to ethnographic investigation and the primary 
source material (particularly news accounts) incorporated. 
7 
 
I.  SETTING THE STAGE: THAI SOCIETY AND POLITICS AT THE DAWN 
OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
 
Thailand is a country of approximately 61 million people situated at the geographical heart of 
mainland Southeast Asia.  Traditionally an agricultural society with an economy based 
particularly mainly on rice cultivation, the country has, since the first part of the twentieth 
century been engaged in an ambitious program of modernization and development, built to a 
significant degree around the recruitment of foreign capital and development of export-oriented 
enterprises.   
Thailand’s Economic Growth and Modernization in the Late 20th Century 
In most respects Thailand has been remarkably successful in her economic development efforts, 
and is one of the few countries to have made the transition from being a low- to a middle-
income country.  Her real growth rates from the 1960s through the mid-1990s were among the 
highest in the world (Warr, 2007), and since this growth was paired with a dramatic reduction in 
the birthrate resulted in palpable, qualitative improvements in the quality of life for almost all 
Thailand’s residents.  That said, the majority of Thailand’s growth occurred in the industrial and 
service sectors,
1
 leaving agriculture, which is still the economy’s biggest employer, as something 
of a poor stepchild. 
 
In the mid-1990s Thailand’s impressive economic growth faltered under the weight of excessive 
commercial debt (most denominated in foreign currencies) and ill-conceived monetary policy 
(Fry, 2004).  Foreign investors pulled their money out en masse during a two week panic in mid-
1997, leading to a collapse of the Thai currency, the baht.  The government was forced to seek 
emergency loans from the International Monetary Fund, under terms which the Thais found 
humiliating.
2
  There was also a general contraction of the economy, resulting in massive layoffs 
and a tightening of credit markets. 
 
Thai politics was also in turmoil in the closing years of the 20
th
 century.  Throughout the period 
when Thailand’s economy was growing, the country was also making bumpy progress towards 
the establishment of a stable, participatory democracy.  Repressive military regimes, which had 
been the mainstay of governance in the years of the Indochinese Wars, gave way first to more 
permissive military-led governments and then, in 1988, to the election of a civilian government 
headed by Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan.   
 
In the eyes of most of the Thai middle class, the ascension of a civilian administration by 
democratic means marked a qualitative – and presumably irreversible – development  in Thai 
politics (Kurlantzick, 2003).  They were thus aghast when, in 1991, the Chatchai administration 
                                                 
1
 From 1960 to 1990 agriculture’s share in the total economy declined from 40% to 17%.  However, the 
proportion of the population employed in agriculture in 1990 still exceeded 60%.  While these figures 
would suggest an underperformance in the agricultural sector, Warr (2007) has pointed out that since the 
1970s agriculture has enjoyed the biggest growth in factor productivity (returns to a given unit of input) of 
any sector of the Thai economy. 
2
 During the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries Thailand had escaped colonization by a Western power, an 
accomplishment matched by no other country in Southeast Asia and a source of considerable national 
pride.  The Thai public was thus exceptionally chagrined to find the country’s monetary and fiscal policies 
being subject to review by international experts. 
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was brought down by a military coup.  Although the military leadership which sought to replace 
Chatchai was ultimately unsuccessful wresting control of the state from civilian hands, the 
events of this period, which included a bloody confrontation between the military and unarmed 
protestors in May 1992, left members of the electorate and, in particular, members of the 
business community, convinced that structural reforms were needed to preclude state capture 
by anti-democratic forces.
3
  They began the process of drafting a new “People’s Constitution” 
which was ultimately promulgated in November 1997. 
The Thai Economy and Thai Politics in the Wake of the Asian Economic Crisis 
The elections of January 2001, which were the first to be carried out under the new 
constitution,
4
 provided the Thai electorate with their first opportunity to respond to the 
disturbing developments of the late 1990s.  By a margin so large as to grant the party a near 
simple-majority, voters sided with the highly nationalist, increasingly populist platform of the 
Thai Rak Thai party
5
 headed by Northern business tycoon, Thaksin Shinawatra.  
 
Thaksin, himself a billionaire who had earned a considerable portion of his wealth through the 
timely – and some would argue, questionable – purchase of a government telecommunications 
monopoly, sold off during a wave of privatization, was nevertheless the darling of the Thai 
masses who saw him as their champion vis-à-vis the Bangkok elite.
6
  Throughout his period in 
office, which ended with a bloodless coup in October 2006, Thaksin remained a strong backer of 
pro-poor legislation such as low-cost health care and direct government investment in rural 
areas. 
 
Somewhat ironically, given what a distant pole it represented in Thailand’s social and (traditional) 
political landscape, Thaksin’s other big source of support was big business.  Although Thaksin 
himself had managed to avoid sustaining significant losses during the currency collapse of the 
1990s, he recognized the bruising impact which the economic crisis had had on the economy as 
a whole and was convinced that the fastest avenue to recovery was by assisting domestically 
controlled firms to make inroads in international markets.  He thus provided significant 
protection and assistance to export-oriented businesses and also fought hard to gain them 
favorable to overseas markets. 
 
                                                 
3
 The concerns of the academics, business leaders and Bangkok elite, who dominated the constitution-
drafting process, extended beyond concerns about future intervention by the military, whom they realized 
could not be completely controlled by legal means, extended also to a desire to circumscribe the 
influence of up-country politicians who were seen as corrupt and excessively parochial. 
4
 The fact that Thaksin came to power under the new constitution is important, since this document, 
designed to consolidate the hold of the Bangkok elite, set strict limits on who could run for office and 
curbed the level of autonomy exercised by party members (Prasirtsuk, 2007).  These measures greatly 
strengthened the hand of the chief executive and enhanced his ability to enforce party discipline. 
5
 “Thai Rak Thai” can be variously translated at “Thais Love Thais” or “Thais Love Thailand”.  In either case, 
the strong nationalist overtones of the party’s platform are clear.  The thrust of their policies was to create 
a favorable environment for the growth and regeneration of Thai business interests through the creation 
(where necessary) of protected market spaces and the provision of direct government support to  and 
intervention on behalf of large export-oriented concerned, in particular. 
6
 Pongpaichit and Baker (2008) claim that Thaksin’s populist credentials were established during his 
protracted and very public battle in court against the National Counter-Corruption Commission, which 
tried to disqualify him as a candidate for public office, citing irregularities in the operations of his political 
campaign and failure to disclose assets. 
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Apart from effecting a shift in political alignments in Thailand, Thaksin also had a transformative 
impact on the culture of governance.  His leadership style was centralized and autocratic, 
bringing not only elected officials but also government bureaucrats under his control.
7
  He also 
sent an unambiguous message to the media and civil society that, unlike previous 
administrations, he was not threatened by their power.
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II. THE STRUCTURE AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE THAI POULTRY 
SECTOR PRIOR TO HPAI 
Before proceeding with a discussion of the HPAI epidemic, as such, it is important to develop 
one more area of background so that the reader can understand why the HPAI outbreak cut so 
deeply through the fabric of Thai society.  Of all the sectors of the agricultural economy which 
might have been affected by an epidemic affecting the exportability of products, the poultry 
sector was amongst the most sensitive in terms of Thailand’s overall economy and society. 
 
The poultry sector in Thailand is large.  Estimates place the standing population of chickens in 
Thailand at about 250 million
9
 (Burgos, et al., 2008) with approximately 80% of households in 
rural areas raising poultry on at least an informal basis (Rushton, et al., 2004).  At a more formal 
level, it is estimated that more than 400,000 Thai jobs are related the poultry and poultry 
processing (Tiensin, et al., 2005). 
 
As important from a political perspective is the contribution which the poultry sector makes to 
national accounts.
10
  Poultry sales constituted more than half the total value added by livestock, 
which in turn comprised about 10% of the agricultural GDP (Costales 2004, NaRanong 2007).  
Export sales are a significant source of this value.  In 2003, the last year in which production and 
export figures were unaffected by the epidemic, Thailand was the world’s fourth largest poultry 
exporter, commanding a 7.5% share of the world’s broiler export sales.  Poultry exports from 
Thailand (primarily, broilers) totaling some 546,000 metric tonnes were estimated to have 
contributed 48.4 billion baht (1.21 million USD) to the Thai economy (Thai Broiler Processing 
Exporters Association).
11
 
  
                                                 
7
 The conventional wisdom in the study of Thai politics had long been that the elected elements of 
government and the bureaucracy functioned essentially as isolated and unrelated components, with the 
high level executives issuing broad policy directives and the bureaucrats determining how these policies 
would actually be interpreted and enacted (Painter, 2006). 
8
 In 2003 Thaksin directed a crackdown on the illegal drug trade which resulted in the disappearance and 
extrajudicial killing of hundreds if not thousands of accused drug dealers.  In many instances those 
targeted were believed to have been implicated for political rather than criminal reasons.  In addition, 
Thaksin attempted to silence opponents in the press by buying out or attempting to shutdown or 
bankrupt media outlets which reported unfavorably on his administration (Kurlantzick, 2003). 
9
 Chickens (including broilers, layers, and native chickens) represent about 91% of all poultry holdings in 
Thailand (Tiensin, et al. 2005) 
10
 Prior to the advent of HPAI the broiler sector in Thailand was growing at an annual rate of between 5 and 
6% (McSherry and Preechajarn, 2005). 
11
 This figure includes both cooked and uncooked chicken products.  There is also a small but growing 
(pre-HPAI) overseas market for duck meat and a negligible sale of eggs and egg products overseas.  
However, neither of these contribute significantly to the total value or volume of exports. 
10 
 
Significant as the export market is, it accounts for only about 40% of total poultry meat 
production, the remainder is destined for local consumption (NaRanong 2007).   Thais consume 
an average of about 14 kilograms of chicken meat per capita per year and poultry consumption 
is rising (or was prior to the HPAI outbreak) relative to the consumption of other sources of 
animal protein (Costales, 2004).  The domestic market for eggs is also considerable.  Thais 
consume approximately 150 eggs per person per year, leading to a total annual sales of 
approximately 615,700 metric tonnes valued at 21.03 billion baht (Thailand National Statistics 
Office, NaRanong, 2007). 
 
Poultry production in Thailand takes place under a variety of circumstances.  Most descriptions 
of the sector segment it into four constituent categories based on size of the operations and/or 
the markets they serve.  These include: informal or backyard producers, small to medium-scale 
commercial producers, large commercial producers and vertically integrated industrial 
producers. 
 
By far the most common form of poultry rearing (as measured by number of farms) is backyard 
chicken production.  These operations are too small and informal to be enumerated in the Thai 
agricultural census, which only registers farms of one hundred birds or larger, and as such 
estimates of their size and number vary greatly.  But a reliable recent assessment claims that 
backyard farms comprise about three-quarters of all poultry flocks in Thailand (i.e., about 2.175 
million flocks) and average about thirty birds in size (Otte, et al., 2006).   
 
Whatever the numbers used, there seems to be general agreement on the characteristics of 
these small, informal producers, most of whom are raising birds of native stock (Haitook, et al. 
2003).  Backyard producers tend to rely on a low-input, low-tech approach to animal husbandry 
in which the birds are allowed to forage freely or subject to minimal enclosure and feed 
supplements and medicaments are limited.  The birds (and eggs) produced in this fashion are 
typically destined for home consumption or for sale at local wet-markets. 
 
An important subset of the backyard poultry sector is the fighting cock industry, which while 
equally small in scale (in terms of the number of birds produced per operation) and also reliant 
on native or native-hybrid stock, tends to employ significantly more sophisticated (if not 
technological) approaches to breeding, rearing and training.  A more involved discussion of the 
fighting cock industry is included elsewhere in this report, but it deserves mention here that 
between 1 million to 6 million birds are assumed to be being raised for this purpose. 
 
Small to medium scale commercial farms, which in 2003 constituted only 6.6% of all poultry 
holdings, are generally a bit more sophisticated in their operations and better linked into 
centralized supply and marketing chains than are the backyard producers.
12
  They range in size 
from 100 to 500 birds (by some definitions, up to 1,000 birds).  The majority of operations in this 
size range focus on (chicken) egg production, although farms of this size also include those 
producing birds for specialty niche markets including native chickens, quail, ducks and geese.
13
 
 
                                                 
12
 Small commercial producers are likely to buy their stock (day-old chicks) from an outside supplier and to 
market their products through a regional distributor. 
13
 Production of birds other than chickens is limited in Thailand and none of these alternative species will 
be covered in this report with the exception of free-grazing ducks, which are believed to have played a 
central role in the propagation of the H5N1 virus. 
11 
 
Large-scale farms are typically operated under contract to agro-processors who may be selling 
their products to domestic or overseas markets.  Farms in this category, which range in size from 
1,000 to 5,000 birds, typically employ quite modern husbandry practices, including standardized 
feeding and medical regimens, contained housing units with at least modest bio-security and 
controlled environmental conditions achieved through the use of evaporative cooling systems, a 
technology which has significantly improved survival and reduced costs associated with rearing 
birds in Thailand’s tropical environment (NaRanong, 2007). 
 
The last class of producers, presumed to number no more than a few hundred facilities but to 
nevertheless account for a large and growing share of total poultry production, are the vertically 
integrated farms owned and operated directly by the agro-exporters.  These highly bio-secure 
facilities, which more closely resemble integrated poultry processing factories than farms, may 
house upwards of 10,000 birds at a single site.  In addition to sealed, environmentally contained 
chicken houses, the integrated facilities oftimes contain on-site hatcheries, slaughter houses, 
and post-slaughter processing facilities (for the conversion of carcasses to finished, cooked 
poultry products). 
 
III. THE HISTORY OF HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA IN 
THAILAND: TRACING THE EMERGENCE OF THE EPIDEMIC  
The HPAI epidemic struck Thailand in four more or less distinct waves (see Figure 1), each with a 
somewhat different pattern of infections and distinct policy response.  The first two waves of 
infection, occurring in late 2003/early 2004 and mid- to late 2004, respectively, resulted in 
widespread infection of poultry flocks with mass die-offs and extensive culls, while the later two 
waves, the first of which occurred during the latter half of 2005 and extended through 2006 and 
the latter in late-2007 (persisting arguably through the present) tended to be better contained 
and more localized in their manifestation.   
 
Figure 1.  Reported Cases of HPAI in Poultry in Thailand, Jan 2004 – Dec 2007 (adapted 
from Gilbert, et al., 2008)  
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Human cases of H5N1 infection have a periodicity which has tended to follow that of the avian 
epidemic, coinciding with the lead edge of the poultry outbreaks.
14
  Although there were 
substantial numbers of human infections (a total of 25 cases resulting in 17 deaths) during the 
early years of the epidemic, by late 2006 Thai public health officials appear to have been 
successful in decoupling the spread of infections in humans from poultry outbreaks, and since 
2007 no human cases of the disease have been recorded (WHO, 2008).  
The Initial Outbreak of HPAI in Thailand 
The appearance of avian influenza (AI) in Thailand in the waning months of 2003
15
 was neither a 
novel nor an unprecedented occurrence.  Influenza strains affecting both human beings and 
poultry have long been endemic to the Southeast Asia region, including Thailand.
16
  But what 
made this outbreak noteworthy was is chronological and geographic context.  In the preceding 
months outbreaks of a highly pathogenic strain of avian influenza (HPAI) based on the H5N1 
strain of the virus had been confirmed in a number of Asian countries, including Hong Kong, 
China, Cambodia and Vietnam, giving rise to fears that an HPAI outbreak might also occur 
among Thailand’s billion dollar poultry export industry (OIE, 2004).   
 
These epidemiological warning flags notwithstanding, the Thai authorities chose to treat the 
earliest instances of mass die-offs reported by poultry producers in Central and lower Northern 
Thailand as isolated point-source outbreaks, rather than as indicators of a more widespread 
epidemic (Tiensin, et al. 2005).  In response to a constellation of political and economic factors, 
which will be discussed in greater detail later in this report, the authorities both suppressed 
information of the virus’ appearance and also responded to the epidemiological challenge that 
these outbreaks posed with highly localized disease eradication measures which were ultimately 
unsuccessful -- both in terms of their most immediate goal of disease containment and in terms 
of their larger goal of impression management and minimizing the impact of the outbreak on 
poultry exports.   
 
By January 2004 the number of “point outbreaks” and the pressure being applied by both 
domestic (The Nation, Jan 15, 16, 17) and international constituencies (Nicely and Preechajarn 
2004a) to acknowledge and respond to the problem was such that the government launched a 
systematic national surveillance program which revealed that the H5N1 strain of influenza had 
spread to almost half (32 of 76) the provinces in Thailand (Tiensin, et al., 2005).  Successive 
waves of surveillance tracked the epidemic’s expansion across 89 districts in 42 provinces, which 
extended from the far north of the country to the South and East (towards the borders with Laos 
and Cambodia) with concentrations in the Central provinces where poultry production was most 
intensive.
17
   
                                                 
14
 Indeed, at one point, public health authorities complaining about the poor state of surveillance 
commented that humans were serving as a sentinel species for detection of HPAI outbreaks in poultry. 
15
 McSherry and Preechajarn (2005) date the onset of the HPAI epidemic in Thailand to November 2003, 
an estimate which is consistent with that of Tiensin and colleagues (2005).  However, according to official 
sources, the HPAI outbreak dates only to January 23, 2004, when the first diagnoses of H5N1 infection 
were confirmed. 
16
 For a more detailed discussion of the epidemiology of influenza in Southeast Asia, including Thailand, 
see Simmerman (2004), WHO Global Influenza Program (2005), and Li et al. (2004). 
17
 Evidence that the cases caught by these successive waves of active surveillance excluded the leading 
edge of the epidemic is provided by the infection incidence curves themselves which peaked in late 
January (Avian Influenza Control Operating Centre, 2004). 
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Compounding the political and economic impact of the zoonotic outbreak was the near 
simultaneous appearance of the first human cases of HPAI-associated influenza in Thailand.  
Two children, both of whom had been in close contact with infected birds, were hospitalized for, 
and ultimately died as a result of, influenza infections resulting from the H5N1 strain of the virus 
(Ministry of Public Health, 23 January 2004).
18
  These deaths, reported not only within Thailand 
(Bangkok Post, 23 January) but also internationally (World Health Organization, 2004), led to calls 
from the Thai public and the international community for a rapid and concerted government 
response, and indeed, such a campaign was soon forthcoming. 
 
Just three days after the appearance of H5N1 in Thailand was publically acknowledged, Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra convened a ministerial meeting at which four government 
ministries were represented, namely: the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (which 
subsequently administered their disease control efforts through the Department of Livestock 
Development or DLD), the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), the Ministry of Commerce, and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  The inclusion of these last two parties, whose portfolios had little if 
any direct bearing on disease control efforts, but rather focused on the communication of 
government policies to audiences both within the country and beyond illustrates the degree to 
which the HPAI epidemic was viewed from the outset as a threat to the country’s economic 
interests (both in terms of its direct impact on poultry sales domestically and internationally and, 
by extension, through its potentially dampening effect on tourist arrivals) with secondary 
concerns relating to the impact which disclosure and containment policies might have on 
Thailand’s relations with neighboring countries and with the international community.19 
 
The measures adopted for disease containment did indeed adhere closely to the provisions laid 
out by such international bodies as the FAO, WHO and OIE.  Among the steps taken was a 
comprehensive cull of all susceptible poultry from farms located within a 5 kilometers radius of 
the site of a confirmed H5N1 outbreak.  Not only were the animals themselves killed and their 
carcasses either burned or buried, but all housing, feed and other potentially infectious materials 
associated with the animals was also destroyed and the premises thoroughly cleaned and 
disinfected. 
 
In addition, movement restrictions were imposed within a 50 kilometers radius of the outbreak 
site.  Some 65 checkpoints were established along the roads leading to and from disease-
affected areas, and vehicles passing through these nodes were inspected to ensure that no 
susceptible animals were being taken from or through the quarantine zones where they might 
come in contact with infectious agents (Nicely and Preechajarn, 2004a).    
 
Finally a 90-day ban was imposed on the exportation of poultry from the affected areas, a step 
which was in actuality redundant as most overseas markets, including the European Union and 
Japan, almost immediately applied their own prohibitions on the importation of all poultry (raw 
                                                 
18
 Eventually the number of human cases of H5N1-associated influenza diagnosed during between 
January and March 2004 would climb to 12, with 8 fatalities resulting.  In all cases, the patients infected by 
the virus had been in direct contact with (potentially) infected poultry (Tawee Chotpitayasunondh, et al. 
2004). 
19
 International organizations including the FAO, WHO, OIE, and JICA are, in fact, expressly mentioned in 
the government’s official communiqué on its HPAI response released in July 2004 (Avian Influenza Control 
Operating Centre). 
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and cooked) originating in Thailand (The Nation, 23 January 2004).
20
  These bans, intended to be 
short-lived, in fact remained in effect with respect to raw meat through the time of this writing in 
2008, and even cooked meat products were given only limited access to Japanese and European 
markets through the end of 2005. 
 
Although the Thai public was scornful of their government’s initial attempts to cover up the HPAI 
outbreak there was also a high level of compliance with and receptivity to attempts to contain 
the disease.
21
  Bird owners, frightened by the devastating impact of the virus on their poultry and 
its presumed implications for their own lives, agreed en mass to surrender their birds in 
exchange for the proffered compensation, which was among the highest rates paid anywhere in 
the region.
22
  Approximately 62 million birds – mostly chickens being raised by small- to 
medium-sized backyard producers – were killed during this campaign, which employed not only 
animal disease experts but also public health volunteers and members of the Thai military and 
cost the government an estimated $132.5 million
23
 (DLD, 2005).  
 
In addition to their culling efforts, officials at the DLD developed educational materials and 
launched a public information campaign designed to encourage compliance with disease 
control efforts and to promote safe animal handling practices both in the context of the culls 
and subsequently in animal husbandry facilities.  This strategy of pairing direct physical 
interventions with public information efforts was paralleled by officials in the MOPH, whose 
emphasis was on preventing animal-to-human or human-to-human transmission of the disease. 
 
The public health campaign, which like the animal health effort, corresponded closely to the 
directives of international organizations (including recommendations from the U.S. Centers for 
Disease Control and the World Health Organization), had two primary components.  The first 
consisted in the ramping up of preparedness at primary health care facilities, including the 
stock-piling of anti-viral agents (Tamiflu) and preparation of containment facilities for patients 
presenting with symptoms suggestive of severe pneumonia.  The second arm of the MOPH’s 
campaign was a media blitz in which they encouraged workers engaged in poultry producers 
and as abattoirs to employ personal protective equipment and to avoid contact with sick birds; 
educational efforts aimed at both retailers and consumers, which explained safe food-handling 
practices and discouraged the sale and consumption of un- or under-cooked poultry; and, finally, 
advisories concerning the appropriate course of action (reporting immediately to a government-
                                                 
20
 Within a week of the Royal Thai Government’s acknowledgement of the HPAI outbreak, the European 
Union, Japan, Singapore and the United States (Thailand’s major buyers) had all closed their markets to 
poultry imports from Thailand, a move which ultimately resulted in a 91% decline in the export of 
uncooked poultry as compared to the year before (Pierce 2005).  Poultry exports, in general, which had 
reached an all-time high of 545,000 tons in the year before, plunged to just 300,000 tons in 2004 (Thai 
Broiler Exporters Association, 2004). 
21
 An important exception to this rule of generalized compliance was that owners of songbirds and 
fighting cocks, individuals who had a far greater economic and emotional vestedness in their birds 
appeared significantly more reluctant to surrender their pets.  The case of the fighting cocks will be 
discussed in greater detail later in this paper. 
22
 Compensation rates ranged from $.50 to $3.75 per chicken (depending on age and use), $2.00 to $3.50 
for ducks, $3.50 for geese, $7.25 for turkeys and $65 for ostriches (all figures in USD, taken from Tiensin, 
et al. 2005).  Except in the case of fighting cocks, these compensation figures correspond to between 80 
and 100% of the birds’ market value (Nicely and Preechajarn 2004a). 
23
 Note, this figure represents only the outlays related directly to compensation, expenditures on materials 
and personnel employed in the culling effort might easily have been double this, although exact figures 
are unavailable. 
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run clinics or hospitals) should someone display severe flu-like symptoms (MOPH, 27 January 
2007). 
 
Public education was not the only goal of the information barrage to which the Thai public was 
being subject during this period.  There was also a secondary campaign underway to win – or win 
back – the confidence of domestic and overseas consumers of Thai poultry.24  High ranking 
politicians, including the deputy minister of agriculture flew to Japan and Europe to assure 
foreign buyers that the government was taking every possible step to contain the disease.  And 
in a particularly high profile move, Prime Minister Taksin Shinawatra himself appeared on prime 
time television consuming chicken and compensation to any person taken ill as a result of 
eating (well-cooked) Thai poultry (The Nation, January 31, 2004).     
(Re-)Evaluating the First Wave Response 
By May 2004 the outbreaks had tapered off
25
 and disease control officials turned their attention 
to planning for the next onslaught of infections, which despite assurances to the public to the 
contrary seemed all but inevitable (The Bangkok Post, 15 May 2004).  Discussions ensued within 
both the public health and animal health communities as to how to refine preparedness and 
control efforts so as to prevent a catastrophic re-emergence of the virus at some future date. 
 
For those whose primary concern was human health, the emphasis of their efforts during this 
period was in boosting the ability of the public health infrastructure to detect and respond to a 
large-scale emergency.  Presumptive diagnostic criteria were developed in order to allow 
medical personnel to recognize and response in a timely manner to early signs of H5N1 
infection (Tawee, et al. 2005).  In addition, public health personnel attended refresher courses in 
infection control with the aim of preventing a recurrence of the SARS experience, in which a 
significant proportion of the cases (outside of Thailand) resulted from hospital-acquired 
infections.  Finally, the Thai government began stockpiling essential supplies, including 
oseltamivir, an antiviral agent which had been shown to have limited effectiveness in curtailing 
the severity of HPAI cases.   Access to oseltamivir was to become an increasingly central concern 
of Thai health authorities as time went by. 
 
On the animal health front the two main issues under discussion were quarantine and 
vaccination.  The quarantine discussions were relatively straight-forward and emerged from a 
realization that the containment measures transplanted from Europe were untenable in a Thai 
context.  Although the DLD had employed almost every imaginable available resource (including 
supplementary support from the MOPH, police and military) in its culling campaign its field staff 
routinely found themselves unable to complete the culling of poultry within the 5-kilometer 
exclusion zones within the time frame (48 to 72 hour) needed to prevent the further 
propagation of the virus.  In fact, implementation efforts were described by one staff member as 
a “rolling kill” with the destruction of the birds taking place on a more-or-less continuous basis as 
disease control teams made their way from one hot spot to the next.   
                                                 
24
 These confidence boosting measures were only partially successful.  Poultry consumption in Thailand 
dropped by 20 to 30% in the first half of 2004 (Nicely and Preechajarn, 2004). 
25
 According to official government reports there were no new cases of HPAI during April and May 2004 
(DLD, 2004).  However, international disease control agencies remained skeptical of these claims and it 
was noted that when the disease “reappeared” later that year the viral strain responsible was nearly 
identical to that which had caused the earlier outbreak (Avian Influenza Control Operating Centre 2004), 
suggesting that the two occurrences were not, in fact, distinct. 
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Conceptually, too, the imported zoning system was observed to be impractical given the near 
continuous patchwork of homesteads, often lacking in discernable boundaries which 
characterize rural Thailand.  In attempting to implement the culling protocols as dictated by the 
FAO and OIE, field officers were forced to make somewhat arbitrary decisions as to which farms 
were selected for culling and which passed over.  This, in turn, sparked resentment among those 
farmers whose animals were included in the kill. 
 
As a result, during the lull in new cases DLD authorities began to shift their internal guidelines to 
favor a more targeted disease eradication strategy better adapted to local conditions.  The radius 
of the kill zones was reduced from 5 kilometers to one.  They also established regional centers 
responsible for disease surveillance and for educating local farmers on the proper housing and 
maintenance of poultry. 
 
Finally, in a move designed to prevent further cases of fraud and abuse should culling resume, 
farmers were required to register their birds with the local authorities (a move which began 
some months before with fighting cocks), and the importation of birds from countries or regions 
where disease had been detected was forbidden (The Nation, July 9, 2004). 
 
Of greater visibility – and acrimony – than the discussions related to the culling policies were the 
debates surrounding the use of vaccination against infection in poultry.  From the earliest days 
of the HPAI outbreak, the owners of exotic birds and fighting cocks, in particular, had suggested 
that vaccination might offer an effective alternative to culling which, they claimed, resulted in 
the senseless destruction of large numbers of uninfected birds.
26
  They were soon joined in their 
petition by the owners of small-scale poultry operations who lacked the capital needed to 
upgrade their facilities in order to comply with the more rigorous bio-security guidelines 
promulgated by the government in June 2004. 
 
Mindful of small producers’ sensitivities on this issue but also of the needs of the export-oriented 
industrial producers to maintain (or restore) their access to overseas markets, which were 
generally hostile to vaccine use, the government decided in July 2004 to establish a national 
committee under the auspices of the National Veterinary Council, which was charged with 
evaluating vaccine use as an approach to HPAI control.  The committee met over a period of two 
months, listening to testimony from a variety of national and international experts and reviewing 
research on the efficacy and feasibility of introducing a vaccine-based regimen as a supplement 
to the culling protocols (which would remain the main feature of the control plan in the event of 
another widespread outbreak). 
 
The committee’s recommendation, released in September 2004, was that the total ban on 
vaccine use be upheld.
27
  In announcing this finding, committee members cited four main 
factors, namely: 
 
                                                 
26
 In fact, tests on carcasses recovered from the culls revealed that upwards of 98% of the birds killed were 
disease-free [source]. 
27
 In fact, the findings of the National Veterinary Council committee were not the final word on vaccine 
use.  The issue came up again in February 2005 and again in October of that year and as recently as 2007 
the government was floating the idea of employing vaccination in ducks and/or fighting cocks and exotic 
birds as a supplement to culling. 
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1) Vaccine use might facilitate the mutation of the H5N1 virus to a yet more lethal 
strain capable of causing widespread human infection. 
 
2) Available vaccines were of insufficient quality to effectively contain the disease, 
especially when applied under the less-than-ideal conditions of actual field use. 
 
3) The diversified conditions found within the Thai poultry sector posed 
insurmountable challenges in terms of the effective distribution and surveillance of 
vaccine use. 
 
4) The economic costs of vaccination were untenable given the unwillingness of 
Thailand’s major trade partners (in particular Japan and the E.U.) to accept birds which 
may have been exposed to the vaccine (Nicely and Preechajarn, 2004b, p. 3-4). 
 
These findings, although put forth as the scientific conclusions of an unbiased scientific panel, 
were nevertheless seen by many small producers in Thailand – and much of the Thai public – as 
a major concession by the government to industrial interests.  As such the policy created a 
resistance to and skepticism concerning subsequent control efforts that persisted long after the 
committee had been disbanded and complicated relations between the administration and the 
public into the second wave of the epidemic. 
The X-Rays Campaign and Thailand’s Response to the Second Wave of the HPAI Epidemic  
The re-emergence of HPAI in Thailand is officially dated to July 3, 2004, when officials confirmed 
an outbreak of H5N1 virus in a layer farm in the Central region.
28
  This second wave of infections, 
which continued more or less uninterrupted through July 2005, ultimately resulted in 1,492 
outbreaks spread across 1,243 villages in 264 districts, spanning much of the country (Tiensin, et 
al. 2005, Meyer and Preechajarn 2006).
29
  The epidemic appears to have peaked in mid-October, 
when new cases appeared at a rate of 61 incidents a week; however, this upturn may be an 
artifact of increased surveillance activity during this period.
30
   
 
Indeed, the most distinctive feature of the second wave of the epidemic was the so-called “X-ray 
campaign”, a simultaneous cross-sectional disease surveillance campaign, which provided 
disease control personnel with almost real-time information on the prevalence and precise 
location of HPAI outbreaks nationwide. What made the X-ray effort so significant was not just its 
                                                 
28
 As was the case during the initial HPAI outbreak, there was actually a lag between the time that poultry 
die-offs were first reported in the press and the government’s acknowledgement of the disease.  In this 
instance, reports of the disease’s re-emergence began to surface in June 2004, but official confirmation 
came only some weeks’ later (The Bangkok Post, 7 July 2004). 
29
 By comparison, during the first wave infections there was a total of 193 cases in 188 villages in 89 
districts (concentrated in the Center and lower North) (Tiensin, et al. 2005).   
30
 There were those who argued that the sudden spike in cases was not an artifact but rather the result of 
an actual increase in the number of new infections, which resulted from the X-ray campaign itself.  
Volunteers traveling from one poultry farm to the next may have unwittingly served as vectors for the 
virus.  While current bio-security guidelines would, in fact, militate against the movement of persons or 
equipment from one farm to another, there is not yet a convincing body of evidence to conclude that the 
campaign contributed to increased disease incidence, which instead seems to coincide with a predictable 
seasonal rise in infections and, in any case, dates to late September (Tiensin, et al., 2005), prior to the first 
round of X-ray surveillance. 
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scope and intensity – endeavoring to survey every household in the country for evidence of 
human or animal disease and in the process collecting more than 150,000 samples over a two to 
three week period – but also its structure which, for the first time since the outbreak of the HPAI 
epidemic (and one of the first occasions in the country’s history), involved a closely coordinated 
partnership between the two ministries – the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and the 
Ministry of Public Health – which had vied for “ownership” of and bitterly opposed one another’s 
initiatives during the first phase of the epidemic.   
 
For reasons which remain murky but perhaps involve some re-assignment of personnel at the 
upper levels of administration, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (working primarily 
through the DLD) and the MOPH resolved in the latter months of 2004 to put their differences 
aside and instead adopt a coordinated approach to the management of the HPAI response.
31
  
They joined hands in establishing a system of more than 1,000 Surveillance and Rapid Response 
Teams (SRRTs), which worked in tandem with the Ministries’ trained personnel in conducting the 
X-ray survey in October and then remained in place, carrying out passive surveillance and health 
education efforts at the grassroots level thereafter.
32
  The composition of the SRRT teams and 
their organizational structure is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 It should not go without mention that at this point the entire disease containment effort was being 
overseen and, at least nominally, coordinated by the Avian Influenza Operations Centre , a cabinet-level 
coordinating body established by Prime Minister Thaksin in February 2004.  Nevertheless, it was only with 
the launch of the X-rays campaign and the establishment of the Surveillance and Rapid Response Teams 
that underpinned it that the two ministries (the Ministry of Agriculture and the MOPH) were able to 
achieve sustained and effective coordination on disease surveillance and control. 
32
 In fact, the success of the first round of the X-rays campaign led the AIOC to adopt it as a recurrent 
strategy for surveillance and disease containment.  As such, SRRT members were subsequently called 
upon to participate in X-rays campaigns on a semi-annual basis from October 2004 through December 
2006. 
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Figure 2. Structure of Thailand’s HPAI Surveillance and Rapid Response Team (SRRT) 
System (after WHO, 2007) 
 
 
The genius of the SRRT approach was that it built upon the existing strengths of and 
complementarity between the two lead ministries.  In particular, it integrated the technical 
expertise of the Division of Livestock Development
33
 with the vast manpower resources and 
grassroots-level volunteer network commanded by the MOPH.  The SRRTs at their most 
localized (or from a Bangkok perspective, distal) level consist of groups of specially trained village 
health volunteers  (VHVs) who were charged with investigating and reporting any unusual 
incidents of poultry or human infection within the communities in which they resided.
34
  Their 
findings were then reported to district level teams consisting of both veterinary and public 
health officials who confirmed reports of suspicious cases and activated a response, where 
                                                 
33
 It should be noted that the SSRTs’ efforts were also supported but the laboratory expertise of the 
MOPH’s Department of Disease Control (DDC) and Bureau of Epidemiology, which provided rapid 
assessment of clinical samples obtained from human patients reporting to local hospitals or health 
facilities with respiratory symptoms consistent with influenza. 
34
 Thailand’s village health volunteer network, which constitutes a key component of the country’s 
primary health care delivery system, was established in 1973 and has been in continuous operation ever 
since.  It comprises a network of approximately 1 million lay health advocates and extends to almost every 
village in the country.  The VHVs, who are lay people selected on the basis of their reliability, interest and 
standing in their community, are routinely called upon to participate in trainings, surveillance exercises 
and health advocacy activities within their home communities under the direction of the local primary 
health care professionals.  In exchange for their time commitment and services they and their immediate 
family members are offered free or reduced cost care in MOPH-operated clinics and public hospitals. 
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appropriate, and also compiled the local data for transmission to the provincial level teams 
(which more or less repeated this process at a yet more centralized level). 
 
While the primary function of the X-ray campaign was, as the reporting protocol suggests, 
disease surveillance and (related to this) containment, the campaign also served a secondary 
function which was public education and public relations.  By creating a sympathetic awareness 
of the perils of HPAI and the complexity of infection control amongst the health volunteer 
network, the campaign also promoted a more positive and cooperative attitude toward disease 
containment efforts among the rural public as a whole.   
 
Compliance was also no doubt abetted by a sudden surge in the number of mammalian – 
including human – cases of H5N1 infection.35  Most worrying among these was the first 
scientifically plausibly instance of direct human-to-human transmission (Ungchusak, et al. 2005), 
which occurred in September 2004.  This “family cluster” outbreak was reported by the Thai 
press in late September and early October, meaning that it roughly coincided with the launch of 
the X-ray campaign (The Nation: 28 Sept, 2 Oct 2004).   
 
One of the consequences of this coincidence in timing and of the involvement of the public 
health volunteers in the X-ray campaign initiative was that it recast the effort in the eyes of the 
Thai public, shifting the emphasis from an initiative aimed at cutting losses in the livestock 
sector (and, in particular, losses experienced by export-oriented poultry producers) to a 
campaign aimed at eliminating a serious threat to human health.  While this had been a motif 
throughout the prevention efforts, it seems to have emerged more forcefully at this time, 
particularly in light of the rising human casualties. 
 
Related to this shift in emphasis (rather real or perceived) was a series of high profile events 
which emphasized Thailand’s role as a regional or even international leader in the investigation 
and control of avian influenza, particularly in humans.
36
  Between July and January 2005, Thailand 
was named the site for a regional coordinating centre serving as the hub of surveillance and 
disease control activities for the Asia/Pacific Region (The Nation, 27 October).  It played host to a 
WHO-sponsored joint ministerial meeting involving representatives from across Asia (14 Nov 
2004), began collaborating with the United States Centers for Disease Control on development 
of a human HPAI vaccine (CDC, 2004), and through an infusion of funds allocated by the Thai 
parliament itself, established a regional diagnostic lab and sent health experts to Vietnam to 
assist that country in its disease containment efforts (The Nation, 26 Jan 2005). 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Within a one month period in October 2004, H5N1 infections were diagnosed in a range of non-avian 
hosts, including dogs, cats, swine, and tigers (Matichon, 4, 12 and 20 Oct. 2004).  This worrying trend 
suggested that the virus may have adapted itself to better survive in mammalian hosts. 
36
 Although the epidemic at all times affected avian populations in far greater numbers and with more 
significant economic consequences than it did humans, international spending tended to favor research 
and control efforts targeting human populations. 
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The Third Wave of Infection 
While each of the first two waves of HPAI infection in Thailand indeed conformed to traditional 
notions of epidemic disease with well described “curves” in which infection rates built steadily 
and then declined, the third “wave”, which ran from July 2005 until approximately January 2006 
(Meyer and Preechajarn 2006) consisted of a series of fairly contained localized outbreaks 
punctuated by extended periods when no new disease episodes were reported.  As such, during 
this period the “epidemic” arguably shifted to a more endemic pattern of infection (Silan, et al. 
2006, Meyer and Preechajarn 2006). 
  
The onset of the third wave is dated to July 10, 2005, just two days before Thailand was to have 
been declared “disease-free” in accordance with international (OIE) guidelines37 (Bangkok Post, 
12 July).  The first outbreak, which affected nine sites in the Central Thai province of Suphanburi, 
was quickly contained and authorities were, at first, hopeful that the outbreak would be but a 
momentary setback in their bid to eliminate the virus entirely (RTG report to OIE, July 15, 2005).  
However, the disease soon resurfaced elsewhere in the Central region, affecting four provinces 
(29 sites) there, before leap-frogging to Kalasin province (The Nation, 31 Oct 2005) in the 
Northeast.  Additional point-source outbreaks, typically involving just a handful of birds, 
continued to arise sporadically throughout the Northeastern region until sometime in late 
2005/early 2006, when the disease again went into abeyance.
38
   
 
From a containment perspective, this new disease dynamic posed different challenges than had 
the original presentation.  No longer was the emphasis on mustering large numbers of personnel 
to respond to mass outbreaks (although at times this was needed).  Rather, officials now needed 
to identify those factors which were allowing the virus to persist – or be reintroduced – 
recurrently.
39
  Their efforts on this front were abetted by the extensive dataset generated by the 
semi-annual X-ray surveys, which since their introduction in October 2004 had become a fixture 
in the disease control landscape.  Reflecting on these data and on animal husbandry practices in 
the areas where HPAI seemed to have become entrenched, officials decided to focus their 
research and containment efforts on three types of poultry operations: free-grazing ducks, 
fighting cocks and “unorganized small poultry farms” (Meyer and Preechajarn, 2006).  
 
                                                 
37
 The OIE's Terrestrial Animal Health Code (Article 2.7.12.2.) specifies that a country which does not 
vaccinate against HPAI can be considered “disease-free” 6 months after the slaughter of the last HPAI-
affected animal.  However, countries which do employ vaccination can only be deemed “disease-free” 
after having gone for 3 years without any cases, since vaccinated animals may harbor the virus without 
displaying clinical symptoms of infection. 
38
 Reports vary slightly as to when the cases in this cluster tapered off, with the WHO reporting that the 
outbreak ended in November 2005 and Meyer and Preechajarn (2006) extending the epidemic right tail 
through January 2006.  In any case, there was again an extended (apparent) disease-free period before the 
disease resurfaced in July 2006. 
39
 Virological evidence suggests that the H5N1 virus was both being conserved and (re)introduced. Tissue 
samples obtained from two sites experiencing near simultaneous HPAI outbreaks in July 2006 displayed 
very different viral signatures.  The first sample, taken from an outbreak site in Pichit (Central Thailand), 
had a signature similar to that from samples collected in Thailand in 2004 and 2005, suggesting that the 
virus had persisted while appearing to have been eradicated.  By contrast, the signatures found in samples 
taken in Nakhon Phanom (Northeastern Thailand) belonged to a viral strain previously seen in southern 
China and Laos but never, until that time, in Thailand (Chutinimitkul, et al. 2007). 
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The identification of these three subsectors as (potentially) important vectors of viral 
transmission was a defensible choice epidemiologically,
40
 but it stoked resentments among 
small producers (including small farmers, fighting cock producers and duck farmers) who felt 
that the government’s policies and, in particular, their resistance to adopting vaccination as a 
containment strategy showed a clear bias in favor of large producers.  Other government 
policies, including movement restrictions, also disproportionately disadvantaged small 
producers, since for them the administrative burden imposed by movement licensing 
requirements was crippling.  A more detailed comparison of the challenges faced by large versus 
small or medium-sized producers is presented later in this report. 
 
Small farmers and duck farmers also came under pressure to conform to heightened bio-
security requirements including at least partial enclosure of the animals’ housing and 
feeding/grazing areas, disinfection of persons, feed and equipment moving into and out of 
animal enclosures, documentation of acquisitions and movement patterns and the upgrading of 
processing (i.e., slaughter) facilities.  The government attempted to lighten the financial, 
logistical and technical burden which these new requirements imposed by, for example, making 
available low interest loans to farmers who wished to upgrade their operations, and many took 
advantage of these offers.  However, many more decided to close down their operations entirely, 
making the period from 2005 to 2006 a period of significant consolidation and restructuring 
within the Thai poultry sector.
41
 
 
The third wave was also a period of consolidation and institutionalization on the policy front.  
During the first two waves of the epidemic, the responsible authorities within both the Ministry 
of Public Health and Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (particularly the DLD) had been 
making policies and adapting them in a rather ad hoc fashion, as befit an acute crisis.  By the 
third wave, however, it was clear to most of those involved with the disease control effort that 
the problem of HPAI was not short-lived and that the policies established to deal with it needed 
to have a similarly long-term character.  As such these two ministries, working under the 
auspices of the Avian Influenza Control Operating Centre (itself under the direction of the 
Deputy Prime Minister), compiled two strategy documents, National Strategic Plan for Avian 
Influenza Control in Thailand and the National Strategic Plan for Pandemic Preparedness in 
Thailand.   
 
These documents, which are briefly summarized below, collectively lay guidelines for both the 
prevention and/or containment of future outbreaks of HPAI as well as the steps to be taken to 
ensure the country’s readiness should the virus mutate into a form that allowed for widespread 
human-to-human transmission.  
 
                                                 
40
In the cluster of outbreaks occurring between July 2005 and July 2006, HPAI was detected at 61 sites of 
which two (3%) were medium-sized broiler farms, three (5%) were layer (chicken egg) farms, three (5%) 
were quail egg farms, and the remainder were either backyard operators (including those raising fighting 
cocks) or informal small chicken producers.  It should be noted, however, that because of the relative size 
of the different operations, broiler, layer and quail farms accounted for the majority of the birds infected 
and destroyed (based on data reported to the OIE by the Royal Thai Government). 
41
 A year-on follow-up survey conducted by researchers from the Thai Development Research Institute 
among farmers who had been raising poultry on a small or medium scale during the first wave of the HPAI 
epidemic showed that 38% had abandoned poultry production altogether in the wake of the subsequent 
outbreaks.  Another 26% had invested in the improvement of their facilities in order to bring them into 
compliance with the new animal husbandry guidelines, while 21% were still considering making such an 
investment ([citation]). 
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The National Strategic Plan for Avian Influenza Control in Thailand 
The National Strategic Plan for Avian Influenza Control in Thailand is a three year plan (2005-
2007) which sets targets for the control of the spread of HPAI in both animals (poultry) and 
humans.  It has as its goal the elimination of new outbreaks of HPAI within “economic poultry” a 
two year time horizon and aims within three years to reduce the incidence of the disease in 
other domestic and wild poultry to such an extent that outbreaks no longer pose a threat to 
either human health or the poultry industry.   
 
In addition, the Plan articulates a goal of zero transmission of infection from animals to humans 
within a two year timeframe.  It sets as a related goal the implementation of pandemic 
preparedness measures (discussed below) within a year’s time. 
 
The National Strategic Plan has six components, which are as follows: 
 
1.  Development of a disease free poultry management system through the improvement of 
poultry housing and husbandry, enactment of a system of zoning and compartmentalization 
system, development of effective disease surveillance (in domestic poultry and wild birds) and 
(re-)assess the feasibility of vaccine use. 
 
2.  Disease surveillance and response during outbreaks – a slight expansion and  
institutionalization of the X-ray surveillance system to allow for near real-time monitoring of 
disease outbreaks at a very local level with recurrent aggregation and analysis of data at a 
national level. 
 
3.  Knowledge generation and management – The plan outlines an ambitious program of both 
basic and applied research, including expenditures on studies of the virus’ basic biology and 
transmission as well as attempts to develop appropriate vaccines and diagnostic kits and 
medicines for treatment of influenza infection.  
 
4.  Capacity-building of organizations and manpower – The medium to long-term objective of 
the plan is to increase Thailand’s ongoing ability to deal with an outbreak of epidemic disease (or 
a related health crisis).  To this end, the plan specifies investment in infrastructure, disease 
surveillance networks (particularly veterinary surveillance) and the training of specialized 
personnel. 
 
5.  Creating understanding and participation in civil society and the private sector – The Strategic 
Plan recognizes a role for non-governmental bodies in the control of HPAI and containment of 
the downstream impact of the epidemic.  To this end, it calls for responsible government bodies 
to reach out to their counterparts in civil society and the private sector and to enlist their aid in 
developing locally appropriate programmes.  
 
6.  Develop sustainable integrated management systems and mechanisms – In keeping with the 
understanding that HPAI (and epidemics of zoonotic origin, more generally) will be an endemic 
or recurrent problem in Thailand, the Plan calls for the establishment of more enduring 
coordinating bodies to both manage information and organize the response at both a local and 
national level. 
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National Strategic Plan for Pandemic Preparedness in Thailand 
The National Strategic Plan for Pandemic Preparedness in Thailand outlines the country’s 
approach to the management and control of any infectious disease threat which might impact 
the country’s health care system on a massive scale.  Developed in response to a call from the 
WHO and, in theory, distinct from the Influenza Control Plan (IC), it unsurprisingly echoes (and 
expands upon) many of the same themes, particularly within the realm of human health. 
 
The key components of the Pandemic Preparedness Plan are as follows: 
 
1. Strengthening the influenza surveillance system – Like the IC plan, the Pandemic 
Preparedness Plan essentially reiterates and gives support to the measures adopted in 
conjunction with the X-ray surveillance campaign but also stresses the need to develop 
improved information handling capacity as well as the ability to more tightly integrate data on 
animal and human health. 
 
2. Preparing essential medical supplies and equipment – This section of the plan speaks to the 
need to stockpile essential diagnostic and therapeutic materials as well as personal protective 
equipment.  The most surprising component of this section, however, is its call for Thailand to 
develop its internal capacity to produce and distribute needed supplies (including oseltamivir). 
 
3. Developing infrastructural capacity and standardized operating procedures – This section 
speaks primarily to the health care system’s needs to extend and improve upon the training 
offered to health care personnel with respect to the management of mass casualties and the 
control of infections in an institutional setting.  It anticipates a situation in which the capacity of 
the traditional infrastructure is overwhelmed and outlines plans for developing surplus capacity. 
 
4. Conducting public relations and public education campaigns – The plan calls for the 
establishment of integrated public communications systems for the communication of risk 
information and to educate the public on disease containment and prevention. 
 
5. Developing a sustainable integrated management system to oversee the pandemic response 
– This point essentially restates the IC Plan’s call for a most enduring and integrated approach to 
disease surveillance and control measures through the institutionalization of coordinating 
networks. 
The Fourth “Wave” of the HPAI Epidemic: Thinking Beyond Endemicity 
The stabilization of policies that accompanied the recognition of the endemicity of HPAI and the 
overall restructuring of the poultry sector in ways that both reduced susceptibility to infection 
and diversity of stakeholders meant that in the years following the 2005 outbreak, Thailand’s 
control policies – and their domestic impact – have changed very little in the years since.  This is 
true despite the fact that there have been seasonal outbreaks of infection on an annual basis in 
every year since. 
 
The apparent complacency which has set in within the poultry sector and among those who 
observe it from outside is reflected in this summary of the HPAI situation filed with the US 
Foreign Agricultural Service by Meyer and Preechajarn in 2007: 
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High Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI), H5N1 type, has hit Thailand periodically since 
January 2004. There are no reports of HPAI-related deaths or culls in broiler farms since 
the reoccurrence of the disease in July 2006 (p. 4).  
 
In the absence of meaningful change – or hope of change – in terms of the disease’s actual 
incidence, movement on the HPAI front in the period since October 2005 has been mainly in the 
area of foreign policy and export promotions.  Thai trade representatives have, since 2005, 
assumed an increasingly aggressive position in the dealings with overseas buyers, trying to 
encourage (even coerce) foreign governments to open their markets to Thai poultry products 
and to endorse the compartmentalization.
42
 
   
 
IV. COMPETING VOICES, COMPETING INTERESTS: DISSECTING THE 
INTERESTS AND NARRATIVES WHICH SHAPED THAILAND’S 
RESPONSE 
Over each of the four waves of HPAI infection which manifest in Thailand and throughout the 
interstices between them different stakeholder groups contributed to shaping both the public’s 
views and the government’s response to the epidemic.  These groups, whose input reflected 
their social position, their economic interests, their epidemiological relationship to the events 
unfolding and their connections to policy makers and the political landscape more broadly, 
jointly defined the environment within which decision-makers forged national policy. 
 
In the section which follows, I will attempt to tease apart the influence of some of the most 
important contributors to this process, namely: the industrial poultry sector, cock-fighting 
enthusiasts, duck farmers, and the persons acting in the realm of public (human) health.  These 
interest groups were selected primarily on the basis of their centrality to the public debates at 
different points in time but also because they are drawn from distinct positions within Thai 
society and as such give insights into the way in which both the epidemic and the measures 
taken to control it have been viewed by and impacted different groups. 
The Industrial Poultry Sector 
Undoubtedly the single most significant factor influencing the Thai government’s perception of 
and response to the spread of HPAI has been the industrial poultry sector, comprising 
predominantly the export-oriented broiler producers and to a lesser extent, the layer industry.
43
  
                                                 
42
 The concept of compartmentalization will be discussed further in the section on the industrial poultry 
producers and their interests, but in brief it refers to a mechanism which allows the products of one well 
regulated segment of the livestock industry to be considered in isolation of products of the same national 
origin made by producers with lower production controls. 
 
43
 There is also industrial-style duck production in Thailand, but this is still on such a limited scale and 
played so marginal a role in HPAI policy-making, that it will be excluded from this portion of the analysis. 
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The weight carried by this sector is not only a product of its considerable economic clout,
44
 but 
also of the degree of political organization and access which the major stakeholders enjoy.
45
   
 
The major export-oriented producers are represented in their interactions with government 
officials and the media by a handful of highly organized and sophisticated lobbying groups, most 
influential among them the Thai Broiler Processing Exporters Association, which describes itself 
as serving as “a regulating and service agency for the large number of Thai chicken meat 
producers and exporters.”  Indeed, the group has been highly successful in both coordinating 
the activities of its membership
46
 and making a concerted statement on the industry’s behalf 
before lawmakers. 
 
At numerous points during the epidemic, decisions taken by Thai officialdom have clearly 
reflected direct input from and/or collaboration with the industrial lobby.
47
  Among the issues on 
which the industrial poultry producers’ interests have figured prominently are: management of 
information related to potential HPAI outbreaks; the receptivity (or rather, lack of receptivity) of 
Thai authorities to animal vaccination; rates and timing of compensation for animals culled in 
conjunction with disease control efforts; regulations on the movement of animals internally; 
negotiation of treaties and agreements related to the sale of poultry and poultry products 
international and in the labeling of poultry for domestic consumption (particularly with respect 
to food safety). 
 
Growth and Restructuring in the Poultry Sector 
 
The H5N1 virus arrived in Thailand in a period in which the poultry industry was already in 
transition, and some of the structural and technical changes associated with the epidemic were 
underway long before the epidemic erupted.  Adaptations such as consolidation of ownership, 
increasing integration of production, adoption of increasingly high-tech, low-labor methods of 
animal husbandry and re-orientation towards the production of specialized cooked chicken 
products for export (as opposed to raw meat for domestic consumption) were changes which 
were accelerated rather than initiated by the outbreak of disease and the changing economic 
and regulatory environments which the epidemic sparked. 
 
                                                 
44
 In 2005 the poultry sector is thought to have contributed between 3 and 4% of the total agricultural 
GDP and generated approximately 28 billion baht in export earnings. 
45
 The outstanding example of this is Charoen Pokphand Group’s chairman and chief executive, Dhanin 
Chearavanont, identified by Forbes magazine as Thailand’s fourth wealthiest man with a net worth 
estimated at $2 billion (USD).  The company’s headquarters, CP Tower, is situated in one of the prime 
addresses in downtown Bangkok. 
46
 In April and May 2003 the association organized a 20% across-the-board reduction in broiler meat 
production in response to a slump in prices and later that year worked with the government and with 
contracting farms to eliminate the use of nitrofans (an illegal growth supplement) which were threatening 
Thailand’s access to European markets (McSherry and Preechajarn, 2003). 
47
 Some examples of decisions which clearly reflect direct industry input were delays in acknowledging 
HPAI outbreaks in November 2003 and June 2004 (The Nation: 31 January and 16 July 2004),  reversals of 
decisions on vaccine use in fighting cocks (13 Sept 2004, 23 Feb 2005), and controversial zoning plans 
which would aid exporters’ in compartmentalizing their production (Bangkok Post  9 June 2004; The 
Nation, 23 Oct 2005).  The industrial producers also openly contributed (financially) to a scheme to boost 
compensation to small producers who surrendered their birds’ during the initial wave of culling (from the 
legally mandated 75 to 100% of the birds’ presumed value). 
27 
 
The initial engine for change in the Thai poultry sector was the Charoen Pokphand Company 
(C.P., now the Charoen Pokphand Group) under the headship of Dhanin Chearavanont.  In the 
1970’s, the C.P. chairman set his eyes on the poultry sector which, at the time, was composed 
almost entirely of small- to medium-sized producers employing low-tech methods to produce 
birds of local stock for the domestic market.  C.P., then a mid-sized animal feed company, began 
importing foreign breeding stock and engaging in a concerted effort to improve the quality and 
efficiency of Thai broiler production with an eye towards eventual exports.   
 
Their breeding program was successful, and over time the company began distributing hybrid 
chicks to farmers throughout the country, who contracted to raise them under conditions 
specified by the parent company, delivering the mature birds to C.P. at an agreed-upon price.
48
  
Over time, the scope of the relationship was broadened such that the contracting farmers 
received all of their consumables (feed, medicine, other supplies and supplements) as well as 
technical advice
49
 from the parent company, which continuously evaluated operators’ 
productivity, eliminating those with unacceptably low levels of weight gain (substandard egg 
production in layers) or high levels of loss. 
 
The gains realized from improved stock and management practices as well as from the 
economies-of-scale realized through scientific management – and even more so, centralized 
purchasing or production of feed – transformed the sector.  An industry which had produced 
birds almost exclusively for domestic consumption was, as production costs fell,
50
 increasingly 
able to market their products overseas, and export production quickly became a central 
orientation of the poultry sector, as represented in Figure 3.  Poultry exports from Thailand rose 
from negligible levels in the 1970s to hundreds of millions of dollars (USD) in the 1990s (see 
Figure 4).  
                                                 
48
 In the case of layers, the farmers would continue to raise and manage the birds throughout their 
productive lives, delivering the eggs to the parent company. 
49
 As time went on contract farming also introduced technological innovations such as new high tech 
technologies including evaporative cooling systems which sped production and improved bird survival.  
The cost of these new technologies was typically shared between the parent company and the 
contracting producers for whom adoption of this technology this was a precondition for retaining their 
contract.  
50
 For a detailed discussion of the changing cost structure of poultry production in Thailand see 
Poapongsakorn, at al., 2006 (FAO). 
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Figure 3.  Thailand Annual Poultry Production, Consumption and Exports (1980-2002) 
based on statistics from FAOSTATS 2005. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Thailand poultry exports (1988-2006) from NaRanong (2007) based on data from 
Thai Ministry of Commerce. 
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The changing cost structures and market opportunities did not only affect export-oriented 
production, which even in 2003 accounted for only about 40% of Thailand’s total broiler sales.  
Contract farming was also replacing autonomously owned and operated enterprises in most 
segments of Thailand’s domestic poultry production market51 and average farms size was rapidly 
increasing (see Table One).  By the late 1990s it was estimated that backyard and small, 
independent growers, who at one time accounted for the vast majority of chicken production in 
Thailand, produced no more than a quarter of the chickens in Thailand (Otte, et al., 2006),
52
 and 
over time even the larger contract farms came under threat through the advent of vertically 
integrated (VI) production systems, which were owned and operated by the agro-processors 
themselves (Tisdell, Murphy and Kehren 1997).  
 
Table 1.  Poultry Exports from Thailand 2003-2006 (adapted from Burgos, et al., 2008) 
 
 
Year 
Broiler Meat (uncooked) Chicken Meat Products Duck meat (uncooked) Pre-cooked Duck 
Quantity (kg) Value 
(M baht) 
Quantity (kg) Value  
(M baht) 
Quantity 
(kg) 
Value 
(M baht) 
Quantity 
(kg) 
Value 
(M baht) 
2003 331,044,896 22,685.9 192,089,974 22,108.9 5,246,441 474.9 13,741,059 1,721.0 
2004 - - - - - - - - 
2005 64,530 2.1 263,418,946 31,550.8 161,680 4.1 6,526,312 1,536.7 
2006 2,285,453 95.6 270,345,449 32,074.6 483,410 8.8 6,753,975 1,633.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51
 The exception to this is in the niche market for “native chicken” varieties which have a following among 
Thai (and other Asian) consumers, who are willing to pay a premium for these birds.  While the industrial 
producers have attempted to make inroads into this market, they have generally been unsuccessful, in 
part because the native birds adapt poorly to be raised in confinement. 
52
 The dominance of very large producers has been less pronounced in the layer industry, in which the 
distribution of farm sizes follows a bimodal patter with peaks in the 100 to 300 bird and 1000+ bird ranges 
(Costales 2004).  Large laying farms, many now owned by the same feed production companies which 
control the broiler industry, have benefited from the same kinds of reforms as the broiler industry.  
However, the returns to scale in egg production have been smaller, and the industry’s growth has been 
capped to some degree by the absence of any significant export market (NaRanong 2007).  Nevertheless, 
total volume of production has grown significantly in the past two decades, enjoying an extremely robust 
5.5% annual growth rate from 1980 to 1990 and 1.1% thereafter (FAOSTATS, 2005).   
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Figure 5.   Composition of Thai Poultry Sector by Farm Size 1993 and 2003 (based on 
NaRanong, 2007) 
 
 
The growing ascendance of VI farms,
53
 a trend still very much underway, represents a further 
consolidation of ownership and control in the Thai poultry sector.  Like the rise of contract 
farming, it has been motivated in large part by the desire of the large export producers (many of 
whom are now also the major suppliers to the Thai domestic market) to realize even greater 
gains from standardized production and centralized purchasing and marketing.  But there has 
been another force driving the conversion from contract farming to integrated production, 
namely the need for exporters to tighten quality controls in order to meet the demands of 
overseas markets, particularly those in Europe (Delgado, et al., 2003).  Scandals related to the 
use of unauthorized feedstuffs and additives (including antibiotics and hormonal agents 
including nitrofurans, a growth enhancer) by contract farmers, as well as concerns over animal 
welfare had caused the European Union, which in 1995 accounted for 12% of all broiler exports, 
to threaten to close its doors to Thai  poultry (Burgos, et al., 2008).  These concerns, particularly 
as they related to animal health and provenance, gained much greater prominence in the wake 
of the HPAI epidemic.
54
 
 
                                                 
53
 Vertically integrated (VI) farms, described in brief earlier in this report, are typically very large scale 
(10,000+ bird) production facilities, which are owned and operated by the parent company directly.  
Because they handle all aspects of production and processing internally, VI operations give the parent 
company complete control over the cost and quality of their products.   
54
 Vertically integrated farms address food safety concerns because they operate as biologically isolated 
environments in which contact between the birds/meat and potential contaminants is (in theory) all but 
eliminated.  Mechanization is employed to minimize the need for human involvement in such routine 
procedures as feeding and cleaning of the houses, and those persons who do come in contact with the 
birds are first subject to disinfection before being outfitted with sterile garb.  Outside inputs including 
transport vehicles, feed or equipment are similarly disinfected before entering the facility and before 
moving from one point to another internally, and even the air to which the birds are exposed is filtered to 
remove potential pathogens. 
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Before moving on to a discussion of the intersection between the ongoing changes in the 
poultry sector and the interests which emerged during the HPAI epidemic, it is important to note 
one additional change in the poultry export sector which began to take effect prior to the 
outbreak of the virus but gathered significant momentum since, namely the rise of value-added 
or pre-cooked products.  Thailand’s original advantage in poultry export markets was the product 
of relatively low production costs coupled with easy access to cheap feed.  However, as other 
large, low cost producers – in particular, China and Brazil – entered the world poultry market, 
Thai exporters saw their comparative advantage in these areas decline.  As a means of evading 
the inevitable squeeze on markets and profits, the major Thai export processors in the late 
1990s/early 2000s began investigating options for increasing the unit value of their products.   
 
They seized upon the production of pre-cooked poultry products which are typically tailored to 
specific markets.  It proved a niche in which Thailand’s low labor costs and ability to deliver 
consistent quality products conferred considerable advantage.  In 1994 value-added poultry 
products contributed just a minute fraction to total exports, but by 2003 more than one-third of 
the value (not volume) generated by poultry exports from Thailand stemmed from pre-cooked 
poultry, and once the HPAI scare closed overseas markets to uncooked meat pre-cooked 
poultry became the singular focus of export production.
55
  Volumes and values for poultry 
exports from Thailand, both raw and cooked, are provided in Table 1 in the Appendix. 
 
Protecting the Interests of Export-Oriented Poultry in an Era of HPAI 
 
From the outset of the HPAI epidemic – indeed, before the appearance of the virus was officially 
acknowledged – it was clear that the spread of a highly infectious zoonotic disease with the 
potential to infect humans would pose a major threat to Thailand’s poultry exports.  The fear of 
major economic losses in this sector impelled animal health authorities to cover up the earliest 
evidence of H5N1’s arrival in November 2003 (The Nation, 31 January 2004), a move which 
arguably contributed to a more protracted and widespread outbreak than would have happened 
had aggressive action been taken immediately and which proved costly on both domestic and 
international political fronts.
56
    
 
Nevertheless, when the virus re-appeared in June 2004, disease control officials again attempted 
to suppress news of the outbreak, which occurred on a large layer farm (Somkid Farms) in 
Ayutthaya province in Central Thailand, where much of the industrial scale poultry production is 
concentrated (Mattichon, 6 July 2004).   Their actions, like many of the subsequent decisions 
taken by Thai policy makers as well as those implementing policy on the ground, show a high 
level of sensitivity to the concerns of the export-oriented producers and their need to maintain – 
or regain – access to lucrative markets in Japan and Europe. 
                                                 
55
 In 2006, the last year for which such data is available, Thailand recorded minimal raw poultry exports to 
Vietnam – the only country then apparently accepting uncooked poultry exports from Thailand.  For all 
intents and purposes, though, since early 2004 all of Thailand’s poultry exports have been precooked  
(Meyer and Preechajarn, 2006). 
56
 Domestically the revelation of the deception (which had long been suspected) led farmers and activists 
to hold rallies protesting the government’s favoritism of large producers and to call for the replacement of 
the officials responsible for the cover-up (The Nation, 1 February 2004).  Internationally, the implications 
were even more dire.  The announcement of H5N1’s appearance in Thailand (which soon became an 
admission that H5N1 had been circulating in Thailand for several weeks) came immediately on the heels 
of a visit by an agricultural delegation from the E.U. which had resulted in that body declaring Thailand 
“bird flu free”.  When it became clear that Thai officials had lied to their European counterparts a major 
diplomatic row ensued. 
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Overseas market access has been the singular focus of the large poultry producers (i.e., broiler 
producers) since the start of the epidemic, and while smaller producers, who were already being 
squeezed by the restructuring of the poultry sector, have often tended to read into the large 
producers actions a malevolence towards the smaller players – who have unquestionably been 
adversely affected by measures which the large producers pushed through – an analysis of the 
large producers’ actions and motives would tend to cast these results as essentially “collateral 
damage”.  Indeed, at various points the larger producers, keen to maintain their public image 
and prevent political backlash, have offered olive branches to the smaller producers.  For 
example, at the outset of the epidemic, large producers voluntarily contributed towards the 
creation of a supplementary fund which was used to boost compensation to small producers 
who had their animals culled from the legally mandated 75% to 100% of the animals’ assessed 
market value.
57
 
 
Indeed, in each of the three areas in which the large poultry producers have taken a strong stand 
which is in some way contrary to the interests of small producers – vaccination, movement 
controls and compartmentalization or zoning – the actions of the larger players have been self-
promotional but not inherently directed towards the destruction of the smaller players (who in 
any event pose little competition to the larger firms except in very specialized niche markets).  
The only area in which the industrial producers’ actions might be read (justifiably) as deliberately 
hostile to small producers is in the field of public (including scientific) opinion in which the large 
firms have aggressively promoted the message that the HPAI epidemic in Thailand has been 
fueled by the actions of small, unsophisticated growers using bio-insecure production 
techniques – a conclusion which, ironically, is now being challenged on scientific grounds.58   
 
It is nevertheless useful to examine the industrial lobby’s position and (putative) involvement in 
the other issues raised above, each of which has proven a lightening rod in Thailand’s internal 
debates on HPAI control.  Before embarking on this discussion I should make clear that none of 
my informants was willing to go on record with an open accusation or denunciation of the export 
industry’s involvement in shaping policies on these issues, although both the media and industry 
analysts have at times been pointed in making these connections. 
 
 
Vaccination 
 
Around no issue has the export poultry industry’s concerns been more strongly articulated and 
their influence more clearly felt than around the issue of vaccination, and around no issue are 
their needs or preferences more clearly in conflict with those of other stakeholder groups.  The 
issue of vaccination (of poultry) has been a perennial lightening rod in the policy debates 
surrounding HPAI control in Thailand, with small producers (in particular, those raising fighting 
cocks and exotic birds) repeatedly advocating for the limited use of vaccination (i.e., the use of 
                                                 
57
 This action was, of course, motivated by the large producers’ desire to encourage compliance with the 
culling orders and to hasten the containment of the epidemic.  But it nevertheless speaks to a desire to 
arrive at these endpoints through conciliatory rather than coercive means. 
58
 For an evidence-based critique of the claim that small producers have been fueling or even contributing 
disproportionately to the burden of HPAI cases in Thailand, see Otte, et al. 2006. 
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vaccination in birds not intended for consumption) and the large poultry lobby consistently 
opposing any vaccine use.
59
 
 
The reasons behind the exporters’ resistance to vaccine use are self-evident.  Foreign buyers – 
including Thailand’s two major overseas markets, Japan and the European Union – have stated 
categorically that they would not accept poultry products from birds which might have been 
vaccinated unless or until it had been scientifically demonstrated that these products posed no 
threat to either human or animal health (The Nation, September 13 & 14, 2004).  Attempts by 
Thai negotiators to get policy-makers in these countries to back down from their positions have 
reportedly been unsuccessful.
60
 
 
Apart from this clear economic rationale, the exporters have publically trumpeted the findings of 
the scientific committee which first proposed the ban on vaccine use,
61
 citing the possibility that 
vaccine use if employed incompletely or based on an ineffective formulation might result in a 
subsequent recurrence of the H5N1 virus in yet more virulent form.  While this is clearly a 
defensible position scientifically, and one put forward at various times by experts in the field 
(Capua and Marangon, 2006), it appears somewhat disingenuous coming from an industry 
(export broiler production) whose most prominent members are also heavily invested in the 
production of laying hens,
62
 an industry in which use of protective vaccination is now reputed to 
be routine.
63
   
 
The influence which the export producers have been able to exert in defense of their position is 
impressive, particularly given the comparatively small numbers of firms which they represent.  
The most visible and memorable example of their influence on policy-making came during an 
incident in October 2004 when Yukol Limlaemthong, Director-General of the Department of 
Livestock Development, expressed his unit’s intentions to establish a laboratory dedicated to the 
development of a poultry vaccine against HPAI.  The move was generally interpreted as a tacit 
expression of support for the use of vaccines once an acceptable candidate became available.   
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 There is potentially an interesting footnote here, as it has been suggested by one of my informants and 
is perhaps hinted in an early news report on the topic that when the HPAI epidemic first erupted (and 
before it was publically acknowledged) the industrial producers in the area of the outbreak supported the 
use of vaccination among small scale producers in the area in order to keep the virus from “escaping” into 
the larger poultry population.  Once it was clear, however, that containment on a local level was not an 
option, the industry turned against vaccine use and has remained opposed to it (publically) ever since. 
60
 The fact that numerous sources have claimed that the issue was raised with importers on multiple 
occasions suggests, however, that both the exporters and Thai government officials would like to be 
“allowed” to lift the ban, at least selectively. 
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 Nicely and Preechajarn (2004b) are among the most direct in questioning the independence of this 
body, suggesting that the very establishment of the committee was a step taken by the government to 
“placate the … export-oriented broiler processors who strongly opposed [the use of vaccines].”  Elsewhere 
(2004a) they note that there was considerable support for the use of vaccination among certain factions 
within the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (although the Ministry of Public Health opposed it). 
62
 Several of the large agro-processing companies which dominate broiler production are also heavily 
invested in layer production, among them Charoen Pokphand (CP), Laemtong and Betagro (Rainat, 2003). 
63
 Reports of widespread use of vaccination in the layer industry have surfaced in the press and been 
reported by the USDA’s FAS and other industry observers (see McSherry and Preechajarn, 2005).  The use 
of vaccination by laying farms is arguably an economically sound and epidemiologically sound decision 
given the birds’ comparatively long productive life (which impacts the capital investment they represent), 
the controlled conditions under which they are raised, and absence of an export market.  
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A few days later an irate Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was quoted in the Thai media, 
lambasting Yukol and denying any commitment on the government’s part to the development 
of a vaccine.  According to the report, which appeared in the widely circulated English-language 
newspaper, The Nation (October 13): 
 
Thaksin sent back the budget request to Chaturon’s [the Minister of 
Agriculture] committee to remove the bird flu vaccine request before 
resubmitting it for approval.  “Why has the bird flu issue been so 
confusing?” [a] source quoted Thaksin as telling the weekly Cabinet 
meeting.  “The government has not allowed the use of bird flu vaccine 
yet, but a budget has been requested for making it. There are plans to 
make vaccine, test vaccine and build laboratories and these confused the 
public and affected the psychology of the market and panicked the 
public.  From now on, Chaturon [the deputy prime minister, who had 
been put in charge of the national coordinating committee on HPAI 
control] will be the only person to give interviews on bird flu issues and 
anyone else must inform Chaturon first before giving any interview.” 
 
This rare open castigation of high placed government official by his superior is testament to the 
pressure which the prime minister was apparently feeling in the wake of indications that his 
administration might be wavering in its position on vaccination.  Perhaps equally telling was the 
fact that approximately one year later when the prime minister was himself at a political impasse 
he startled analysts by issuing a statement re-opening the vaccination debate and suggesting 
that there might be room to “build immunity [to HPAI] in the Kingdom’s avian population” (The 
Nation, November 8, 2005).
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As an interesting coda to the vaccination saga, which has recurred at intervals throughout the 
epidemic, is that as industrial poultry production has shifted its orientation to cooked products 
for which sensitivity of markets towards vaccine exposure seems less and as the recurrence of 
outbreaks has become more sporadic and localized, the stern resistance of the export producers 
to vaccine use has also relaxed (although their official position remains unchanged).  In January 
2007, for example, the government put forward a proposal for very limited vaccine use (which 
appears to have gone unimplemented but was also not directly challenged) and aggressive 
measures to intercept illicit vaccine imports have also been abandoned (The Nation, January 18, 
2007). 
 
 
Movement Controls/Zoning Restrictions 
 
Less vigorously debated but no less divisive in terms of their differential impact on small versus 
large producers were the introduction of zoning proposals and movement restrictions.   
Although distinct pieces of legislation and promulgated independently, both of these strategies 
served to physically segment the country, thus seeking to overcome a complex dimension of 
the HPAI control in Thailand, the diverse admixture of small and large producers (and the 
facilities which supported their operations) in close proximity. 
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 It should be noted that at this juncture Thaksin was in an antagonistic relationship with much of the 
Bangkok elite and seeking to build a more populist basis of support. 
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Zoning restrictions, which were proposed on at least two occasions but never actually enacted, 
consisted of controls on the type of enterprises or poultry production practices which could go 
on within a given geographic area (typically defined in terms of  district or provincial boundaries).  
The zoning plans, which were first floated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives in 
February 2004 and revived in July 2005, were a transparent attempt to protect the (bio-secure 
and profit-generating) industrial producers from the (potential infectious, politically 
unconnected) small producers and their contaminants. 
 
While blatantly discriminatory with respect to the small producers located within the areas zoned 
for industrial-style production, the zoning schemes were nevertheless fairly even-handed in their 
treatment of like producers within a given region and included provisions for the compensation 
of small producers driven from production or for the conversion of their facilities to more bio-
secure production systems where feasible.  The resistance that the plans faced and the reason 
for their ultimate failure was the scale of displacement entailed in enacting the measures.  The 
geographic intermingling of the large and small operations was so complete that there was no 
district in which the plan could be enacted without significant disruption.  In addition, it 
remained unclear that if such measures were taken the physical barriers thus created would ever 
be recognized by poultry importing countries as a meaningful division between “high-risk” and 
“risk-free” production systems. 
 
Movement controls, by comparison, were temporary containment measures which were applied 
specifically to regions which had experienced (or were adjacent to areas which had experienced) 
recent outbreaks.  According to legislation promulgated in June 2004 and renewed in October 
2005, the movement controls affected farms located within a 10 kilometer radius of a confirmed 
(or for the first 30 days until diagnostic test results were available, suspected) H5N1 outbreak.  
For a 90 day period following such an outbreak no susceptible animals were to be transported 
from or through the affected area except with a permit granted by the local animal health 
authorities. 
 
This last exemption was one of the sources of greatest friction between small and large 
producers.  Put in place (presumably) at the behest of the large producers who needed to adhere 
to strict production schedules and to move their birds, which they claimed to be disease-free, 
from points of production to points of slaughter and/or processing, the controls came to place a 
disproportionate burden on smaller producers who, among other things, could exert less 
pressure on disease control authorities to grant them permits and were thus forced to endure 
longer waits and greater losses.
65
  The differential became even more pronounced as the large 
firms shifted their production to vertically integrated systems in which it was sometimes not 
even necessary to transport the birds from the premises. 
 
Compartmentalization 
 
In some ways analogous to the physical segmentation of production achieved by movement 
controls was the conceptual and legal segmentation achieved by compartmentalization.  
Compartmentalization is a concept introduced by the World Animal Health Organization (OIE) in 
the mid-1990s.  It consists of a virtual segmentation of a country’s production of a given product 
(form of livestock) based on evidence of epidemiologically and physically distinct circumstances 
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 The waiting time for the industrial producers was negligible since they were able to perform the 
required health checks on their birds internally and get permission for large numbers of birds to be moved 
at once. 
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in one production environment (defined in terms of a region and/or type of producer) as 
compared to another.  Compartmentalization is intended as a mechanism which would allow 
producers who are certified to have adhered to bio-secure production and handling practices to 
participate in international markets separately from their compatriot producers who fail to meet 
these standards (Meyer and Preechajarn, 2006). 
 
From the time that the nitrofuran controversy threatened to close European markets to Thai 
poultry, the largest producers – specifically those operating vertically integrated facilities – were 
engaged in negotiations to have the products of these operations recognized as distinct (from a 
health and regulatory perspective) from those of  their compatriots.  The effort originally 
generated significant controversy, not only between the very large producers and their smaller 
competitors (truly small operations were not concerned with export markets), but even among 
poultry exporting firms, since many exporters had not yet converted their production to 
integrated operations and feared being disadvantaged by the new arrangements. 
 
The advent of HPAI changed the industry’s thinking about the issue of compartmentalization, 
which since 2005 has been a major rallying point in negotiations between Thai trade 
representatives and their counterparts in overseas markets.  Initially the Thai delegation’s efforts 
met with no success in either European or Japanese markets (Meyer and Preechajarn, 2006, 
2007b).  However, late in 2007 a breakthrough in negotiations between the Thai broiler industry 
and Japanese importers created a possible opportunity for the program to be implemented and 
within short order inspectors from the DLD certified two vertically integrated export producers, 
Charoen Pokphand and GFPT, as meeting the minimal standards for independent consideration 
(Meyer and Preechajarn, 2007b).  The scheme moved forward in 2008 when importers in the 
European Union also indicated a receptivity to the idea after OIE officials independently 
ascertained that the DLD-approved producers adhered to international standards.  However, 
there are, as yet no instances of sales (specifically, sales of uncooked poultry products) which 
have been completed under the auspices of the arrangement.   
 
What makes compartmentalization compelling and potentially decisive from the standpoint of 
domestic politics is that it allows, at least conceivably, for a near-complete disengagement of 
trade practices and interests from the promulgation of disease control policies internally.  As 
such, progress in the implementation of the compartmentalization scheme may eventually free 
the hands of Thai bureaucrats to better address the diverse interests of different constituent 
groups, allowing, for example, for the routine use of vaccination as a HPAI control strategy in 
high value birds (like fighting cocks) and reducing the need for strict zoning or movement 
controls outside of export-production facilities. 
Cock Fighting: The Great Wager in the Bird Flu Debate 
If industrial poultry producers were the darlings of disease control officers responsible for 
stemming the HPAI outbreak, cock fighting enthusiasts were their nemesis.  Engaged in a 
contentious relationship with officialdom which long predated the HPAI outbreak, proponents of 
cock fighting, who are estimated to number in the hundreds of thousands, were among the 
most vocal and persistent critics of the government’s approach to influenza control and, in 
particular, of the decision to forego vaccination as an alternative or supplement to culling. 
 
Were the cock-fighting enthusiasts an isolated lobby unto themselves it is likely that their 
protests would have gone unheeded.  However, in many respects they became the voice for the 
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multitude of backyard poultry producers who felt their interests to have been marginalized in 
the national debates about HPAI and its control.  As such, both rural constituencies and the Thai 
media seem to have placed disproportionate weight on the views of fighting cock enthusiasts 
who, as recently as June 2007 were still staging protests in Bangkok calling for the relaxation or 
repeal of legislation controlling the movement of birds and imposing other restrictions on the 
practice of cock-fighting.  The fact that vaccination is still appearing on the national agenda and 
still an issue in policy debates about HPAI control almost three years after the problem of 
widespread outbreaks had essentially been contained and long after industrial poultry producers 
had abandoned their interest in this issue is also reflective of the centrality of the cock-fighting 
lobby to this issue. 
 
Cock-fighting: The National (Male) Pastime 
 
Cock fighting is a sport with a long and distinguished history in Thailand.  Enthusiasts claim that 
one of the prime Thai fighting cock lines was bred by King Naresuan, the Thai monarch who led 
his country to victory over the Burmese in the 17
th
 century (Forbes, 2001).  Whether or not this is 
the case, cock-fighting was undoubtedly a sport that was widely practiced and publically 
accepted in Thailand as recently as the early part of the twentieth century.  However, as the 
country modernized and Western middle class sensibilities filtered in, the sport fell into disfavor 
among the educated elite who pushed forward legislation circumscribing the site, timing and 
circumstances of cock-fighting as well as the wagering which surrounded it.  Cock-fighting thus 
joined the ranks of issues such as polygamy (or its surrogate, prostitution) and spirit-worship 
among the issues which defined class rivalries and internal cultural divides within Thailand. 
 
If non-elite Thai have in many ways lost the policy debates, seeing their sport relegated (at least 
officially) to a limited number of approved venues on specified dates and times and with adapted 
rules, they have nevertheless triumphed in the court of public opinion.  Cock-fighting has a large 
following in Thailand, extending far beyond the ranks of those who directly raise, train and fight 
the birds to include those who wager on them, those who run supplemental industries 
supporting cock-fighting (these include trade publications, manufacturers of special feeds and 
medicaments, producers of equipment used in rearing and training fighting cocks, operators of 
licensed and unlicensed arenas and concessionaires selling food and other products at these 
venues), residents of rural and low-income urban districts who tolerate if not actively support the 
enterprise and even some intellectual and cultural elites who take cock-fighting as a symbol of a 
besieged indigenous culture. 
 
In terms of its actual scale, estimates vary widely.  Media accounts of the number of birds being 
raised as fighting cocks vary from a low of about one million to a high of fifteen million birds or 
higher.
66
   There are no more reliable official or academic estimates of the size of the cock-
fighting industry, although tallies of native chicken production, of which fighting cock 
production is sometimes considered a subset, estimate that as many as 80% of rural households 
keep some birds either for recreation or home-consumption.  An informal village survey carried 
out in the context of this research would suggest that no more than one in ten of these 
households are actually raising birds for sport, although the trainers interviewed typically 
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 It seems likely that the actual number of fighting cocks lies somewhere towards the midpoint of this 
range, if not somewhat higher given that a national campaign to register the birds -- a proposal which met 
with significant resistance among bird handlers and thus was unlikely to have achieved anything 
approaching comprehensive rates of subscription -- enrolled close to a million birds within a few months’ 
time. 
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claimed to be holding between ten and fifty birds each (these included young birds which were 
not yet being fought as well as breeding stock). 
 
Another proxy for the size of the industry is the proliferation of affiliated activities.  There are at 
least four (and more likely six to ten) semi-glossy magazines dedicated to cock-fighting, bearing 
titles such as “Cock Fighting Man” or “Friend of the Fighting Cock”.  Although statistics on their 
distribution are not systematically maintained, they appear in most cases to be printed on a 
monthly or semi-monthly basis and to be distributed through newsstands throughout the 
country.  Their publication is financed not only by sales of magazines themselves, but although 
through advertisements taken out by commercial interests including breeders and trainers 
promoting specific birds, manufactures of feed, supplements, balms and medicaments used as 
part of standard bird-rearing practice and also to treat ailments and injuries resulting from 
competition, firms manufacturing cages or selling materials used for the housing of birds or the 
construction of fighting arenas, and well known trainers selling instructional videos and/or 
training equipment. 
 
In addition there are numerous trade associations and lobbying groups including the Association 
of Fighting Cock Career Promotion, the Siamese Fighting Cock Association, the Siamese Fighting 
Cock Breeding Association and the Thai Indigenous Chicken Conservation and Development 
Association.  These organizations both serve as informational network for enthusiasts and also 
as spokesmen on behalf of sport before the legislature, government ministries (particularly the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, which regulates production and feedstuffs, and the 
Ministry of the Interior, which licenses arenas and governs other aspects of bird fights) and in the 
media.   
 
The Contentious Relationship between Cock-fighters and Thai Officialdom 
 
Even prior to the outbreak of avian influenza cockfighters and cockfighting enthusiasts had a 
strained relationship with Thai officialdom.  The laws regulating the time, place and 
circumstances of fights were so restrictive that they rendered the vast majority of matches (not 
to mention the betting and other activities surrounding them) illegal.  Local officials, among 
them village headmen, subdistrict officers, police and animal control officials, professing to act in 
the interest of enforcement, then extorted significant sums from the match organizers and 
participants in order to allow the contests to go forward, creating a de facto “tax” on the 
proceedings.
67
 
 
Although the enthusiasts spoken to in the context of this research were aware that the 
collection of these sums constituted blatant acts of corruption, they nevertheless identified the 
root of the problem as lying in the legislation itself which they said created the opportunity for 
graft.  It was thus the government itself, rather than its petty officers, to whom they blamed for 
the sometimes substantial “overhead” placed on their sport.   
 
It is unsurprising, then, that following the advent of HPAI and the associated disease-control 
legislation cock-fighting enthusiasts reacted hostilely and with a great deal of skepticism to 
government claims that mandated culls, inspections and movement controls were necessary to 
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 Almost every informant interviewed made explicit reference to the bribes which had to be paid to local 
officials in order to allow cock-fights to take place.  In a yet more ironic twist more than one informant 
directly implicated a local administrator as an organizer of local cockfights while others mentioned the 
presence of village and sub-district officers at matches. 
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ensure the welfare of both the birds and their handlers.  Indeed, some of the earliest reported 
acts of defiance of the legislation occurred among fighting cock owners who smuggled their 
birds out of quarantined regions to prevent them from being culled (The Nation, February 9, 
2004). 
 
Out of fairness to the bird owners, though, it should be noted that the sacrifice being demanded 
of them was not on par with that made by other “backyard chicken producers”.  Fighting cock 
owners tend to maintain a close and personal relationship with the birds they rear, devoting 
hours a day to the care, feeding and training of their birds.
68
  Their spouses similarly joked that 
the men – for it is an almost entirely male sport – lavished more attention on their birds than 
they did on their children. 
 
There was also an economic dimension to the cock owners’ resistance.  For while the owners of 
birds being reared as layers or for home consumption were being offered between 75 and 100% 
compensation for the value of birds culled in conjunction with HPAI control efforts, the cock-
fighters were being offered mere pennies on the dollar for birds whose value often exceeded 
1,000 baht per bird.  As such cock-fighters’ aversion to the culls should not simply be interpreted 
as an act of defiance aimed at the government.   
 
However, antagonism to officialdom played into the equation also, particularly as the epidemic 
dragged on and the cock-fighters witnessed a series of decisions taken which they viewed as 
prejudicial to large producers and/or antagonistic to their own interests.  The two issues around 
which this played out most clearly were vaccination and movement controls. 
 
To Vaccinate or Not to Vaccinate: That is the Dilemma 
 
The resistance of the export-oriented industrial poultry lobby to vaccination was transparent in 
its origins.  The position of fighting cock enthusiasts, who ultimately came down overwhelmingly 
in favor of vaccination, was less cut-and-dry.  Unlike industrial chicken producers whose contact 
with their birds was limited and who therefore faced little immediate threat from the spread of 
HPAI in birds, fighting cock handlers were commonly in intimate contact with their birds and, 
indeed, two of the earliest cases of human infection with H5N1 in Thailand occurred among 
individuals who had had close personal contact with fighting cocks, a fact widely reported in the 
press (The Nation, Jan 24 and Feb 28, 2004).
69
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 These time estimates are consistent with the care and training protocols described in cock-fighting 
magazines and online sources. 
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 As a paradoxical side note to the comment that cock-fighters were highly sensitized to the public health 
dimensions of the epidemic.  There existed in parallel or at least in close succession to these fears a 
persistent belief among many bird handlers that fighting cocks were, in fact, more resistant to HPAI than 
other birds, and on these grounds some owners justified sequestering their birds and protecting them 
from the culls.  The handler’s views may have been based on (misleading) empirical evidence, since 
fighting cocks are often kept somewhat segregated from other birds except when mating or sparring 
(meaning that they may have been less exposed than other birds).  Also, because fighting cocks are not 
raised in large flocks, their deaths would not have manifest in the large-scale die-offs which occurred in 
broiler and layer populations.  That said, the epidemiological data seems clearly to indicate that fighting 
cocks were at least as susceptible as other poultry populations and may, in fact, have been implicated in a 
disproportionately large share of the later outbreaks (perhaps because of breeders’ efforts to subvert 
controls). 
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Fighting cock handlers were thus well aware that the unchecked spread of HPAI could pose an 
imminent threat to their own health and that of their birds and were as eager as any member of 
the general Thai public to see the epidemic brought to a quick end.  That said, bird owners were 
not eager to submit to disease control efforts, especially preventive culls.  Because of their 
personal relationships to their birds and the birds’ value, some of which was captured in their 
gene pool and thus could not be redeemed through cash outlays, fighting cock owners were 
particularly eager to see their specific birds – not just birds of equivalent type and age or value – 
salvaged.  They thus became the earliest and most vocal advocates of a disease control effort 
based around vaccine use (at least in the fighting cock population). 
 
The cock-fighters lobbying efforts on behalf of vaccination have been relentless and vociferous.  
Among the tactics they have employed are mass rallies,
70
 celebrity endorsements,
71
 and 
advertisements and statements in the Thai language press.   
 
Through these measures the cock fighters have succeeded on at least four occasions – in 
October 2004, February 2005, November 2005 and March 2008 – extracted pledged from 
government policy-makers to seriously consider, if not overtly approve, the selective vaccination 
of birds which are not intended for consumption or export.  And while the tendency may be to 
see their repeated failure to carry the issue as a sign of political weakness, this conclusion would 
be naïve given the stiff opposition they faced from the export poultry lobby.   
 
Indeed, the cock-fighting lobby’s ability to bring the matter to such a high level of visibility on so 
many occasions is at some level a triumph not only of the enthusiasts themselves, but also of 
rural interests more generally.  Over time and across multiple iterations of the battle the cock-
fighters have gained considerable sympathy among the rural electorate (as well as the urban 
poor), who have come to see the cock-fighters as proxies for the interests of small farmers vis-à-
vis the industrial producers. 
 
The cock-fighters have also had another influential card to play in the vaccine debate, namely 
the threat – indeed, the reality, of illicit vaccination.  When the decision was taken not to endorse 
vaccine use and, indeed, to ban the importation of poultry vaccines, even for use in select 
populations, the fighting cock community set up their own (unofficial) channels to obtain and 
distribute the vaccine surreptitiously.
72
 And despite the occasional interdiction of shipments, 
there is widespread agreement among poultry industry analysts that vaccine use is rampant in 
the cock-fighting community (McSherry and Preechajarn 2005, Meyer and Preechajarn 2006, 
Tiensin, et al. 2005). 
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 Public rallies in support of the vaccination of fighting cocks were held or threatened on the following 
dates:  [dates].  At the largest of these rallies it is claimed that more than 5,000 enthusiasts turned out in 
support of the measure. 
71
 The most recognized spokesperson for the fighting cock lobby is the well known singer Ad Carabou who 
was made honorary president of the Association of Fighting Cock Career Promotion.  Carabou himself 
raises fighting cocks and in September 2004 in a statement to the Thai media he claimed to have 
vaccinated his own birds using sera obtained illegally from overseas. 
72
 It should be noted that even as these illegal supply chains have flourished and presumably proven 
profitable for some providers, cock-fighting enthusiasts continue to bemoan the fact that they cannot 
access information and support on vaccine use from government extension workers. 
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Movement Controls and Travel Documentation 
 
A second source of on-going tension between the cock-fighting enthusiasts and those seeking 
to prevent the further spread of HPAI was the policies put in place to prevent the movement of 
potentially diseased animals from or through areas of infection.  A mainstay of disease control 
legislation, the movement controls attracted far less attention and public protest than did the 
government’s anti-vaccination policy.  However, in the minds of cock fighting enthusiasts and 
advocates they were no less onerous.   
 
Indeed, the movement controls, which specified that birds that were to be transported over 
provincial boundaries obtain a certificate of health from a DLD veterinarian within 2 weeks of the 
move, were a significantly more cumbersome imposition than was the vaccination ban, perhaps 
because the movement controls loomed as an ever-present burden on bird handlers.  Although 
the movement control restrictions were not unique to fighting cocks, they affected this 
population disproportionately given the frequency with which the birds had to be moved.
73
 
 
Furthermore, because the cock-owners lacked either the numbers or economic clout to make 
their birds’ inspection a priority in the eyes of the local veterinary authorities, they complained 
that requests for inspections were often subject to extensive delays causing them, in some 
instances, to miss a scheduled match and, more commonly, to move the birds without the 
appropriate permissions, paying bribes to the authorities responsible for enforcing quarantines.  
Fight organizers also paid additional compensation to authorities to “look the other way” when it 
came to inspecting participants’ paperwork. 
 
Unlike the vaccine issue, however, the question of movement controls was resolved to a certain 
extent amicably through the introduction of so-called “bird passports,” an ingenious invention 
developed by animal health authorities working in cooperation with fighting cock enthusiasts.  
Bird passports were developed as an alternative to a suggestion floated by the National Bird Flu 
Control Task Force that fighting cocks be implanted with machine-readable microchips which 
would uniquely encode the bird’s identity.  This plan was opposed by those raising the birds on 
the grounds that the chips would cause the birds discomfort and potentially impede their ability 
to fight.   
 
Instead, the handlers recommended that the authorities adopt a system of identification based 
on the unique characteristics that the birds already possessed, namely a distinctive pattern of 
coloration, scarring and facial profile which breeders claimed could be “read” by anyone familiar 
with the sport.
74
  The authorities accepted this proposal and devised an official travel document 
based on a set of photographs of each birds head and legs and an imprint of their feet (see 
Figures 6 and 7).  These documents, which were relatively inexpensive to produce and created 
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Whereas owners rearing birds for egg production or direct consumption might move their birds across 
provincial boundaries only once in the bird’s life (for slaughter) – and even less frequently when integrated 
facilities were employed, cock fighters might have to do so every two to three months in order to give 
their birds access to matches in more prestigious (higher stakes) arenas which tended to be concentrated 
in regional centers or in Bangkok.  Birds were also moved significant distances for breeding purposes (or 
after having been procured from a breeder of particular renown). 
74
 Correct identification of a given bird is, indeed, essential to cock-fighting since matches are arranged 
and bets placed on specific birds on the basis of their pedigree and performance in previous fights.  Were 
one bird to be substituted for another of significantly greater – or lesser – potential it could dramatically 
affect the outcome of the match and of the wagers staked on the contest.  Thus both the handlers and 
the punters need to be assured that the birds competing are as claimed. 
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little inconvenience and no risk for bird handlers represent a rare example of successful 
negotiation in the government’s otherwise stormy relationship with cock-fighters over HPAI-
control. 
 
Figures 6 &7.  Images of Fighting Cock Passport (Taken from WHO 2007) 
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Duck Farming and the Spread of HPAI in Thailand 
Prior to the economic crisis of the late 1980s, and arguably prior to the advent of the HPAI 
epidemic a decade later, few commentators on the rural Thai economy would have given 
separate attention to the farming of ducks, which was historically a small sideline enterprise 
practiced by a subset of farmers as a form of income augmentation.  Duck farming was – and 
remains to this day – a far more limited enterprise, both in economic import and in geographic 
and numerical scope, than the farming of chickens, and most accounts of animal husbandry in 
Thailand make only passing mention of the practice [sources]. 
 
What first propelled duck farming into a more visible and economically prominent position was 
the confluence of two factors.  The first of these was the introduction of a new system of duck 
rearing, known as open-field duck production or free-grazing, which provided a low-cost, 
ecologically sound (or so it seemed prior to the advent of HPAI) approach to the production of 
duck meat and eggs based on “free” gleanings from rice fields.  The second was the Asian 
economic crisis, which in 1997 dislodged thousands of workers of rural origins from their paid 
employment in the Greater Bangkok Metropolitan area, and sent them fleeing back to their 
communities of origin where their land-holdings and traditional economic opportunities were 
often insufficient to sustain them.
75
  These workers, especially those resettling in Central and 
lower Northern Thailand where growing conditions were favorable to open-field duck 
production, enthusiastically embraced the new form of animal husbandry which allowed them to 
turn their surplus labor – with little additional land or capital inputs76 – into a reasonably 
productive asset. 
 
The open-field duck farming system comprises an integrated approach to animal husbandry in 
which ducks, which can convert scavenged food into marketable meat and eggs, are driven by 
their handlers over newly harvested rice fields.  There the birds collect grain which was lost 
during the harvest and winnowing process, a particular problem in an era of mechanized harvest 
and processing,
77
 and also feed on the insects, slugs and snails – including the cherry snails, an 
important rice pest – which accumulate in the fields during the cropping and harvest cycle.78  As 
an added bonus to the rice growers, whose land is made available to the duck keepers for this 
purpose (typically with a small rental fee attached), the ducks in their grazing deposit manure on 
the fields, further enriching the soil and increasing subsequent rice yields.   
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 Many of the rural migrants who moved to Bangkok in the 1980s and early 1990s in search of economic 
opportunities in the modern sector did so at least in part in response to a shortage of arable land in rural 
Thailand.  Other migrants sold their land back home in order to gain access to capital, reasoning that with 
paid employment an option, they had little need for agricultural land-holdings (and little access to the 
labor needed to make the land productive).  The widespread reverse migration of the late 1990s however, 
reversed a long-term trend and resulted in an over-population of workers in rural areas.  
76
 The start-up capital for open-field duck production is typically supplied by a Chinese financier, known 
colloquially as a tao kae, who supplies the money needed for the purchase of day-old ducklings and the 
feed needed to bring them to the age (approximately 20 days) at which field grazing is possible.  From this 
point, relatively little additional capital inputs are needed until the ducks are ready for market, at which 
point the tao kae return to serve as marketing agents and to collect on their investments. 
77
 It has been estimated that when mechanized harvesting and processing is employed, as is now the 
norm in rural Thailand, more than 16% of the rice produced is lost during the transition from standing rice-
stock to threshed grain (Matichon, 25 December 2004). 
78
 The problem of pest build-up has become particularly severe with the introduction of improved rice 
varieties which allow paddies to be under almost continuous cultivation (three crops/year) as compared to 
traditional systems involving one to two rice crops a year with significant periods of fallow. 
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Open-field duck farming is thus a win-win arrangement between the duck keepers, who are 
often managing flocks ranging in size from 500 to 2,000 birds and transporting them across 
multiple non-contiguous fields with the use of trucks, and the rice farmers (Costales, 2004).  It 
has also been a significant boost to the rural economy, particularly in areas where near-
continuous rice cultivation is practiced, making it feasible to engage in open-field duck 
production on an ongoing basis, as well.  Little surprise, then, that rural residents reacted 
negatively to the DLD’s surprise announcement in late 2004 that it was seeking to put an end to 
the practice of open-field duck cultivation, forcing duck rearers to return to the practice of 
closed-system production in which birds are raised in an enclosed area. 
 
Livestock officials were no doubt also chagrined to be making the recommendation that open-
field rice production be closed-down, after all it was their own extension agents who had first 
promoted the practice which had been one of their more successful interventions.  Indeed, from 
the introduction of open-field duck farming in the late 1980s or early 1990s to the outbreak of 
HPAI in the mid-2000s duck farming had grown from being a small scale, entirely domestic 
concern to a rapidly growing, increasingly export-oriented enterprise.  Indeed, in 2003 Thailand 
was the world’s third largest producer and fourth largest exporter of duck meat79 with expanding 
markets in Asia and Europe (World Poultry, 2005). 
 
The Smoking Gun: Open-Field Duck Cultivation and the Transmission and Propagation of HPAI 
 
What spurred officials to intervene in duck production was the accumulation of virological and 
epidemiological data pointing to ducks, and in particular open-field duck production, as an 
important contributor to the propagation and perpetuation of the HPAI epidemic.  The first 
indication that ducks might not only be susceptible to the H5N1 virus – a blow to common 
wisdom which dictated that ducks were largely immune to influenza infection – but might 
furthermore serve as important reservoirs of the virus came from virological research carried out 
in southern China.  Li and colleagues (2004) tested blood and fomites samples taken from 
domestic duck populations in an area which had experienced widespread die-offs of other 
poultry, including chickens, and found that the ducks were infected with nearly identical strains 
of the H5N1 virus.   
 
When this research was extended to viral strains isolated from infected birds from Southeast Asia 
it was found that domestic ducks could indeed be infected with the local H5N1 strains but 
typically displayed few if any clinical signs of the disease and seldom succumbed to their 
infection.  Yet more disturbingly, these apparently healthy birds were shown to shed significant 
quantities of the virus in their fomites (feathers, down and manure) and the viral particles were 
unusually stable, remaining active and capable of causing new infections in birds – or possibly, 
people – who came in contact with them up to seventeen days after they had been deposited 
(Hulse-Post, et al. 2005). 
 
Added to this speculative evidence of ducks’ role in the propagation of H5N1 was 
epidemiological data gleaned from the first round of X-ray surveillance which demonstrated a 
strong geographic correlation between outbreaks of H5N1 in chickens (which incidentally 
                                                 
79
 Duck meat production in Thailand in 2003 was estimated at 112,000 metric tons (up from 108,00 MT 
the year before), of which 98,000 metric tons were consumed domestically and 13,300 metric tons were 
exported (up from 11,100 the year before and representing a 54% increase in export value compared to 
2002) (World Poultry 2003, 2005).  
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coincided more or less with outbreaks in humans) and density of open-field duck production.  
Indeed, a series of studies by Gilbert and colleagues (2006, 2007) demonstrated that this 
relationship held true at both a very localized and more macroscopic level and that the 
correlation between duck farming and HPAI outbreaks was stronger even than correlation of the 
disease with other suspected causal agents such as backyard chicken production and proximity 
to wildfowl breeding areas. 
 
With this evidence in hand animal health officials believed they had their “smoking gun” which 
plausibly explained the persistence of HPAI virus over periods and in regions in which all visibly 
diseased animals – or members of the flocks to which they belonged – had been destroyed.80  
Asymptomatic ducks which invisibly harbored the virus might be serving as a reservoir in which 
the virus could persist for extended periods of time, circumventing efforts to eradicate the 
disease through the elimination of possible carriers.  Furthermore, the movement of the ducks, 
abetted by mechanized transport, also explained the ability of the virus to “jump” from one area 
to another non-contiguous site in a short period of time. 
 
Attempts to legislation duck production and sources of resistance 
 
Animal health authorities responded to this information with a stringent set of regulations 
designed to close down the loophole in their protective measures by eliminating open-field duck 
cultivation.  In October 2004 they issued an advisory informing producers that they had three 
months to transform their duck farming operations from open-field to closed-system styles of 
management (The Nation, October 19), meaning that birds were to be kept in enclosed facilities 
where their contact with other poultry or open waterways would be restricted.   
 
The DLD began a campaign to promote the new production systems among duck farmers, 
offering both technical and economic support to those who signed onto the new approach.  In 
February 2005, just as these measures were to have taken effect, the Avian Influenza Control 
Team headed by then-Deputy Prime Minister Chaturon Chaisang put forth a plan to use 
government funds to buy out all remaining duck stocks and to then convert the operations to 
closed farming system – a plan which was vetoed the very next day by the only official more 
senior, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawat (The Nation, February 15)  
 
Thaksin’s resistance to the control plan seems to have been based largely on the resistance 
which he was hearing from the small- to medium scale duck producers, including the financiers 
whose money backed the open-field duck farming system.  These stakeholders realized that 
given the realities of land-holding patterns in the Central and lower North regions where duck 
farming was most concentrated and the relative profitability of open- versus closed-system duck 
production,
81
 conversion would only prove a viable option for the large commercial producers 
whose access to capital and geographic mobility would allow them to set up new production 
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 It is important here to stress that across multiple waves of HPAI outbreaks the strain of the virus 
identified from diseased carcasses was, in general, remarkably similar, suggesting that the virus persisted 
in some invisible or quiescent state, rather than having been reintroduced (Viseshakul, et al., 2004). 
81
 A farmer quoted in the Thai press estimated that closed-system farming, which required that the ducks 
be maintained on purchased feed year-round, would cost producers approximately ten times what they 
were paying to produce birds using the open-field system (The Nation, December 10, 2004). 
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facilities in the less densely populated Eastern seaboard region where other integrated poultry 
operations were also being relocated.
82
 
 
In the face of the stiff opposition and the Prime Minister’s own resistance to the conversion 
scheme, the DLD rescinded its ban on open-field duck production and instead announced plans 
to introduced limited vaccination of poultry (other than chickens, but including ducks) intended 
for domestic consumption (The Nation, February 22, 2005).  It should be noted that this policy, 
which appears as yet not to have actually been enacted, flew in the face of prior announcements 
which consistently rejected vaccination as a component of the national disease control strategy.   
 
As a final step, the DLD also imposed strict movement controls on poultry within zones 
immediately affected by HPAI (The Nation, July 13, 2005).  These controls, which while opposed 
by duck producers were nevertheless widely adhered to, have since been renewed in 
conjunction with each subsequent outbreak of disease.  The DLD has also continued to offer 
support and incentives to farmers who have expressed a willingness to convert their operations 
to the more biosecure closed-farm systems and have over time succeeded in convincing an 
estimated 60% of producers to make the transition (The Nation, August 15, 2006).
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Ducks and Vaccines 
 
As a final rather ironic footnote to the battle between the DLD and duck producers over the use 
of culling and biosecure production facilities as compared to vaccination as the mainline 
defense against HPAI outbreaks, disease control authorities in January 2007 again floated the 
idea of allowing limited vaccine use as a bulwark against the spread of H5N1 in birds intended for 
domestic markets (exported birds cannot be vaccinated because of controls imposed by the 
importing countries) (The Nation, January 18).   
 
The great irony of this proposal is that it comes at a time when the preponderance of evidence 
suggests that vaccination, particularly among ducks, is a technically ill-advised solution.  Vaccine 
trials carried out since 2004 have indicated that unlike chickens, ducks require multiple doses of 
the vaccine to build up sufficient titre to confer effective immunity and that even when 
subjected to a 3-shot regimen, a significant proportion of the birds develop only enough 
immune protection to prevent symptomatic infection but nevertheless can harbor 
asymptomatic, subclinical infections which, from a disease control perspective are at least as 
problematic as symptomatic infections (which can trigger culls). 
 
At the time of this writing there had been no firm consensus reached on the status of the 
vaccination question, and in the absence of an acute outbreak it seemed unlikely that more 
decisive action would be taken although active research and consultation on the issue 
continues within the Division of Livestock Development.   
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 Indeed, so fierce was opposition to bird flu control legislation among duck farmers and so well-
organized was the lobby that they earlier threatened to march on Bangkok and release their birds on the 
grounds of Government House where Parliament sits (The Nation, July 17, 2004). 
83
 Note, it is unclear to what extent this purported “conversion” rate actually represents a consolidation of 
the duck industry in parallel to the transfer in ownership and geographical transition which occurred 
among broiler producers some years earlier. 
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Human Health and Vaccine Development 
The last of population of interest in explaining the Thai government’s understanding of and 
response to the HPAI epidemic was the human population itself.  The inclusion of this item as 
the last of the points addressed in this analysis is reflective of the fact that human health 
concerns and the interests which represented them were, in many ways, a somewhat marginal 
inclusion in the debates which swirled around HPAI disease control legislation.   
 
This is not to say that the Thai authorities were unconcerned about the implications of the 
disease for human health.  On the contrary, as one well placed animal health official commented, 
the protection of humans from disease was the absolute “bottom line” in the government’s 
evaluation of its disease control policies.  But the issues which the disease raised in public health 
circles often had little overlap with those discussed in animal health-related fora, and where 
there was overlap – as was the case in the debates surrounding vaccination (of animals) – 
representatives of the animal and public health communities generally sparred, often 
acrimoniously, especially in the months preceding the X-ray surveillance campaign which was 
first launched in October 2004.
84
 
 
Indeed, October 2004 can be seen as a watershed, dividing two epochs in the public health 
response to HPAI in Thailand.  Prior to this date, health officials were fully occupied by the acute 
care needs of actual or suspected cases.  Seventeen of Thailand’s twenty-five confirmed cases of 
H5N1 infection in humans (17 of which ultimately resulted in death) occurred during the period 
from January to October 2004 and during the second half of that calendar year alone 2,235 
people reported with possible or probable flu symptoms (Department of Disease Control, 
2004).
85
  
 
It was only after the initial deluge of infections had passed that public health officials could take 
stock of the situation and begin to articulate their longer term priorities.  As they did so, two 
themes emerged.  The first of these was the need to equip the public health system to deal with 
a nationwide emergency of a massive scale.  Secondary but not unrelated to this fairly 
immediate aim was the goal of national capacity-building, and specifically enhancing the 
country’s diagnostic, surveillance and research capabilities. 
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 Tensions between the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and the Ministry of Public Health 
reached such a level that in  September 2004 Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra called the two men to 
task and demanded that their ministries work together towards combating the epidemic.  (The Nation, 
9/30/04) 
85
 The concentration of cases (or suspected cases) was even more pronounced than these statistics 
indicate, all the confirmed H5N1 cases, and most of the suspected disease events took place either in 
January 2004 (the period of greatest concentration) or in the period from August to October of that year 
(DDC, 2004; Tiensin, et al. 2005). 
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Case Detection and Treatment: Responding to the Early Waves of HPAI Infection 
 
Thailand has been praised for its prompt and effective response to the initial outbreak of HPAI, 
which is believed to have significantly reduced the overall number and severity of human 
infections (WHO, 2006; Barnett, et al., 2005).  Many of the policies which were employed to 
contain the human disease burden – to the extent that these were distinct from the more 
generalized campaign to reduce the transmission of infection among animals (and hence from 
animals to humans) were actually borrowed from the campaign launched in response to the 
SARS outbreak a year earlier (Chunsuttiwat 2008).
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One of the cornerstones of this approach was an aggressive public information campaign aimed 
at alerting the public to the presence of the disease and educating them on the basic preventive 
measures that could be taken to reduce the likelihood of infection.  Interestingly, the public 
education efforts launched by the MOPH in the early months of 2004 appear to have been 
effective in raising awareness of and fears concerning the spread of HPAI.  However, they did not 
translate into greater self-protective activity on the part of the general public, and as such did 
not serve to reinforce the messages being circulated (independently) by the Ministry of 
Agriculture concerning safe animal husbandry and food handling practices. 
 
Another key component of the initial public health response was the effective screening of 
possible cases and implementation of effective infection control measures to reduce the 
likelihood of the disease being transmitted within a hospital context.  Among the protocols 
implemented for the containment of infections was the treatment of presumptive cases (i.e., 
persons who presented with symptoms consistent with influenza even in the absence of a 
confirmed laboratory diagnosis) with oseltamivir, an anti-viral agent which appeared to have at 
least modest effectiveness in treating H5N1 pneumonias, provided that it was administered 
promptly (Auwerakul 2008).  The aggressive use of oseltamivir based therapy may have reduced 
the number of HPAI-related fatalities in Thailand, it certain increased the country’s perceived 
need for access to the drug, which, in turn, fed into a campaign to produce it locally (which will 
be described below). 
 
Finally, with the launch of the X-ray surveillance effort the Thai public health system moved from 
an approach based on passive to one based on active surveillance.  It did so in concert with 
officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and their efforts were, at this point, mutually reinforcing, 
combining the (volunteer) personnel of one agency with the disease-specific expertise of the 
other.  In point of fact the collaboration between the MOPH and the DLD on HPAI came to be 
seen as a model for long-term coordination in response to any zoonotic disease outbreak, and as 
such the principles employed in the short-term response to this epidemic evolved into the 
foundations of a larger, longer-term effort.  
 
                                                 
86
 SARS, which stands for severe acute respiratory syndrome, was a highly contagious respiratory ailment 
which first emerged in 2003 and affected countries throughout East and Southeast Asia as well as Canada. 
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Pandemic Preparedness and Longer Term Planning 
 
An intermediate point between short- and long-term planning in the minds of Thai public health 
officials was the promulgation of a national pandemic preparedness plan, developed at the 
behest of the World Health Organization, but also seen by those within the Ministry as an 
important planning and coordinating mechanism.  The plan laid out a 3-year program by which 
the Thai government, and the Ministry of Public Health,
87
 in particular, could systematize the 
gains made and lessons learned during the initial phase of the response and also develop the 
logistical capacity to backstop a large-scale response. 
 
In terms of discerning the goals and logic of the public health community’s response to HPAI, 
what is most telling about the Pandemic Preparedness Plan, is not its specific contents (or 
omissions) but rather the way in which each of the constituent elements is developed, always 
with an eye to advancing the system’s overall capacity.  As such the HPAI response was to be 
used as a catalyst which could help propel the public health system and health research 
infrastructure to the next level of sophistication, much as foreign and domestic investments in 
health made during the AIDS crisis of the 1990s had established the foundations of the current 
infrastructure. 
 
This longer-term thinking is evident in the way in which the Plan draws parallels and bridges 
immediate needs with objectives of longer term capacity building.  For example, it identifies as a 
single goal the (short-term) objective of stockpiling sufficient oseltamivir (an antiviral agent) to 
treat up to 325,000 patients and the development of the capacity to manufacture a generic 
form of the drug (in exportable quantities) within a five-year time horizon.  Similarly, it links the 
immediate goal of obtaining an appropriate influenza virus (for use in humans) to the longer-
term (5 year) objective of building the country’s capacity to manufacture such a vaccine. 
 
While goals such as the manufacture antiviral agents in exportable quantities or production of a 
sophisticated vaccine may have at first glance appeared unrealistically ambitious goals for a 
middle income country with an established but still quite basic pharmaceutical infrastructure, 
they appear in the eyes of international health experts to have been appropriate and well chosen 
goals and in both instances Thailand’s bid to garner external support for these efforts was 
successful. 
 
In February 2006 the Swiss drug manufacturer, Roche, under pressure from the international 
public health community to increase the availability of its product, agreed to license the Thai 
Government Pharmaceutical Office (GPO) to produce oseltamivir (to which Roche held patent 
rights under the brand name, Tamiflu) for local sale.  Around the same time the GPO was again 
recognized, this time by the World Health Organization, which identified it as one of only five 
national labs selected for development as an international vaccine production centre.
88
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 In fact, the National Pandemic Preparedness plan is intended as a coordinating document which 
specifies roles for at least 13 government bodies.  However, most of the roles laid out in the plan are 
assigned to agencies which are attached to the MOPH. 
88
 In addition to recognition, the endorsement brought Thailand a pledge of monetary and technical 
support from the world body on the condition that their investment be met by a similar commitment on 
the part of the Thai government.  Accordingly, the Thai parliament authorized the expenditure of more 
than 700 million baht for long-term preparedness measures including the development of oseltamivir and 
vaccine production capacity (The Nation, January  
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While it would be an overstatement to claim that the outbreak of HPAI has been a windfall for the 
Thai public health community and, in particular, its research arm.  It is unquestionably the case 
that the interest generated by the country’s geographic centrality relative to the global 
pandemic, its openness to the conduct of research and its capacity to support increasingly 
sophisticated technical endeavors has allowed the research community to capitalize on the 
opportunities which the H5N1 virus has created.  If history (in particular the history of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic) is any indicator, both those directly affected by the virus and the Thai public 
more generally will also be long-term beneficiaries of the investments made in Thailand in this 
context. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Analysts chronicling Thailand’s response to the HPAI epidemic have drawn attention to the 
nation’s achievements, among these: her apparent success in curtailing the spread of HPAI in 
both humans (amongst whom there have been no further cases since 2006) and animals (with 
no widespread outbreaks among poultry in the same period); the containment of losses within 
the broiler industry, which is now arguably even more competitively positioned relative to global 
markets than it was at the epidemic’s outset; the promotion of the nascent Thai pharmaceutical 
industry and of the biomedical sciences in Thailand more generally; and the establishment of a 
comprehensive grassroots disease surveillance network which can be employed not only for the 
active monitoring of the influenza situation but in response to any zoonotic or infectious disease 
threat.  These are, indeed, credible and laudable accomplishments for which the Thai 
government – and the Thai private sector, especially the industrial poultry sector – deserves 
recognition.   
 
However, this depiction of the HPAI control effort and its impact is incomplete.  Importantly, it 
ignores the ways in which the effort has given short shrift to certain stakeholder groups and 
allowed political calculus to triumph over prudence in ways that might have ended in disaster – 
not only for Thailand, but for the larger global community, as well – had the virus’ mutations 
followed a different course.  It is worth recapitulating these less hagiographic dimensions of the 
epidemic, as well, in order to clarify the tradeoffs that were made. 
 
One of the starkest tradeoffs in Thai policy-making related to HPAI was the country’s balancing 
of the interests of the large producers against those of the small- to medium- sized entities.  
While it is self-evident that any country with such a large and economically vibrant industrial 
poultry sector would go to great lengths to preserve and protect that sector’s interests, it is not 
clear that Thailand’s effort need have been implemented in a manner that was so costly to the 
smaller producers who, while economically less influential, were (and are) nevertheless quite 
numerous.  Yet on issues ranging from vaccine use (or the prohibition thereof), to the control of 
animal movement, and restrictions on husbandry practices (including mandating the use of 
more capital-intensive production facilities), the Thai government consistently and almost 
unilaterally sided with the large producers, making only token concessions (such as the vaccine 
use review panel) to small commercial and non-commercial interests. 
 
Clearly feeding into the government’s pattern of decision-making was a broader concern with 
regenerating the country’s foreign reserves, which had been badly depleted during the 
economic crisis of the late-1990s.  Of all the subclasses of poultry producers, only the industrial 
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producers contributed substantially to this larger national goal.  There was, furthermore, a 
natural affinity between the Thaksin administration, staffed to a vastly disproportionate degree 
by former(?) businessmen and others with a commercial orientation, and the agribusiness 
interests which controlled the export-oriented poultry concerns.  Their overlapping social, 
political and economic interests would have provided the industrial producers with a degree of 
access to policy-makers which was unmatched by any other group, and in a very hierarchical 
political climate such as that which prevailed under Thaksin, it would have taken relatively few 
such contacts to exert considerable impact on the way in which policies were drafted and 
enforced. 
 
Another crucial issue is the way in which information was managed, especially in the early stages 
of the HPAI crisis.  It is, on the one hand, a testament to the diplomatic savvy of the Thai 
government that the country managed to evade being tarred with the same stigmatizing brush 
that cost the Chinese government so dearly in the wake of the SARS cover-up.  That said, there 
seems clear evidence that Thai authorities actively and deliberately concealed information 
concerning H5N1 outbreaks in poultry on at least two occasions (in November 2003 and June 
2004), and that they subsequently failed to disclose (or, at least, expose) evidence of vaccine use 
(among layer farms) even as they were assuring their overseas markets that such practices were 
forbidden within Thailand’s borders (which they were, legally). 
 
Were the implications of Thailand’s active manipulation of its image overseas (and for that 
matter, domestically, among Thai consumers) solely a matter of impression management, then 
it might be dismissed as a matter of political posturing.  But the practical implications of these 
decisions, in terms of the speed and enthusiasm with which the early outbreaks of disease were 
suppressed, extend far beyond politics.  During the period that the Thai government was 
responding to the first manifestations of the H5N1 epidemic as localized outbreaks, the virus 
spread to operations throughout the country, exposing many times more birds – and humans – 
to infection than need have been the case.  It is, furthermore, unclear the extent to which 
subsequent outbreaks within large-scale industrial facilities may have been dealt with internally 
rather than disclosed to the public. 
 
In any case, the government’s failure to deal forthrightly with the presence of the virus both hurt 
its credibility with the Thai public and ironically (given the government’s goals in suppressing the 
information) damaged ties with importers (especially the E.U.).  One wonders, if the Thai 
government had, from the outset, been concerned with equally protecting the interests of all its 
citizens – including small-producers and humans potentially brought in contact with the disease 
– if it might not have responded to the earliest signs of infection with greater alacrity and resolve 
and in doing so achieved yet better results from the standpoint of disease containment. 
 
Finally, the Thai government has used the HPAI epidemic as an opportunity both to  showcase 
the accomplishments of it public health sector (including the country’s nascent pharmaceutical 
industry) and to enhance the sector’s capacity, particularly from the standpoint of research.  One 
wonders, however, how many tangible gains the average Thai has realized from these 
investments, including the commitment of millions of baht in matching funds to the 
establishment of vaccine development efforts and antiviral manufacturing capability in place of 
investment in general medical infrastructure and staffing.  While it is conceivable that the Thai 
public will, in the long-term, be well served by the advances made in these areas, they have, in 
the short-term been left without a more comprehensive health safety net which might have 
served their immediate needs. 
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Furthermore, the arms-length stance which the Thai medical and public health communities – 
and, to a lesser extent – the veterinary health communities have taken vis-à-vis international 
agencies, whose representatives they welcomed as conference delegates but whose actual 
input was marginalized, has also cost the government and the society in terms of potentially 
valuable exchanges of experience and perspectives.  Thailand’s “go-it-alone” approach has, 
thankfully, proven adequate to her needs, but also prevented a potentially fruitful cross-
fertilization of ideas on issues such as vaccine use, in which domestic political interests dictated 
that she shut down dialogue and take ownership of the matter internally. 
 
An effective policy response is, first and foremost, one which addresses the issues at hand, which 
in the case of the HPAI epidemic in Thailand meant preventing or at least containing the spread 
of the H5N1 virus.  This Thailand has done with a fair degree of success, although she was unable 
to prevent the virus from becoming endemic in poultry (a goal which may well have eluded her, 
no matter what actions she took).   
 
Effective policy-making also, however, takes into account and carefully balances the needs of 
various stakeholder groups, and here Thailand’s success was largely cosmetic.  Thai authorities 
did manage – sometimes through creative problem-solving, such as the issuance of “bird 
passports” and sometimes by creating uncharacteristic openings for the expression of 
dissatisfaction (like the cock-fighter rallies) – to provide safety valves for the release of political 
tensions without meaningfully addressing the needs of groups being squeezed by the industry-
friendly policies being promulgated. 
 
Policy-making is, inevitably, a tradeoff between competing goals and interests and this analysis 
has attempted to reveal the dynamic interplay amongst the different groups most centrally 
affected by the spread of HPAI in Thailand and the ways in which this may have affected the 
national response.  Having such an explicit characterization of the policy-making environment in 
Thailand and a description of the ways in which HPAI-control policies, once promulgated, were 
implemented, should make it possible to compare the decisions taken by Thai authorities to 
those of their counterparts in other Southeast Asian countries and elsewhere in the world. Such 
a cross-national analysis, it is hoped, will ultimately enable not only those who make policy 
directly but also those who advise them to better carry out their responsibilities. 
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APPENDIX A:  METHODOLOGY 
 
The present study combines data collected through semi-structured interviews and 
ethnographic observation with information gleaned in a systematic fashion from the Thai press.  
A brief description of each of these methodologies and overview of the informants contacted in 
the course of the field research is provided below. 
Content Review of Thai Media Sources 
In order to compile an over-arching chronology of relevant events and to glean contemporary 
perspectives on these developments, a survey was taken of articles appearing in the Thai press 
during the period during which the epidemic was being covered by the print media.  While most 
representative perspective on the media’s coverage might have been obtained by doing a panel 
sample of coverage across different publications at different points in time, this proved 
unfeasible since few of the Thai language dailies (or weeklies) are routinely archived (even in Thai 
university libraries).   
 
Hence the author settled on a strategy of more comprehensively canvassing a smaller range of 
publications.  In particular, with the assistance of a research assistant fluent in both Thai and 
English, she reviewed the coverage of HPAI and HPAI-related policymaking in the two major 
English-language Thai dailies, The Bangkok Post and The Nation, both of which were available in 
electronic form for the entire period in question, and the coverage of HPAI and select related 
topics (including: the poultry industry, the pharmaceutical industry, disease control and 
agricultural exports) in the Thai-language daily, Matichon, which serves a predominantly 
educated, middle and upper-class readership.  Archival holdings of Matichon were complete only 
for the period from 2004 to 2005. 
 
Both a count and a brief summary of the contents and tone of articles relevant to the research 
topic were recorded and articles with more detailed coverage were photocopied for subsequent 
analysis. 
Key Informant Interviews   
The field research component of this study was carried out between June and August 2008 and 
relied primarily on interviews with key informants carried out in person, whenever feasible, or by 
phone.  Informants were selected through a combination of snowball sampling (gathering the 
names of potential informants from those who had already been interviewed) based on multiple 
seeds (most obtained through personal contacts); direct solicitation of individuals identified in 
published sources, in meeting records or other interviews as having taken part in specific 
proceedings; and institutional referrals from the public relations or central administration of 
organizations which played a key role in the events in question. 
 
A general description of the persons contacted in the course of these interviews is included in 
the table below.  As a general point, though, it should be noted that among those contacted 
there was a high degree of reluctance to be interviewed on the topic on record, with some 
potential informants refusing even to speak to the researcher on an informal basis and many 
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more asking to do so “off the record” and with no recording of the proceedings.  This was in 
sharp contrast to the author’s prior experience in interviewing Thai informants on issues related 
to health or economic development and suggests both the atmosphere of uncertainty which 
prevails within the bureaucracy at present (since most of those contacted were in government 
positions) as well as the highly political nature of the subject matter in question. 
 
For informants who did agree to be interviewed “on the record” either with their names used or, 
at least, with the interview conducted in person in a more formal manner, the interviews were 
generally conducted at their place of work and consisted of 60 to 90 minute conversations 
which, whenever possible, were tape recorded.  The interviews were conducted either in English 
or in Thai (at the informant’s discretion) and were semi-structured in nature with questions 
tailored to the informant’s area of expertise.  In most cases the interview also included some 
brief chronology of the epidemic’s major events which was used to both position anecdotes 
shared by the informant in time, and to provide background to and confirmation of the 
chronology which emerged from media sources. 
Table of Informants 
Informant’s title Nature of Employing 
Organization 
Topics covered 
Researcher/administrator   International organization – 
animal health, livestock 
production 
History of epidemic, policies 
promulgated and rationale, 
role of government bodies, 
role of international 
community 
Research staff, supervisor Gov. org responsible for 
animal health and livestock 
promotion  
Policy development and 
promulgation, relations with 
other government bodies, 
relations with international 
organizations 
Research staff Gov. org responsible for 
animal health and livestock 
promotion 
Background on duck raising 
and policies related to same, 
internal structure of gov.  
ministry and process of policy 
promulgation and 
enforcement 
Field staff (by phone) Gov. org responsible for 
animal health and livestock 
promotion 
Background on animal 
husbandry practices in rural 
areas, review of government 
policies, description of 
enforcement practices and 
reception among locals 
Staff researcher Agricultural arm of foreign 
service delegation to Thailand  
Chronology of epidemic, 
overview of Thai gov. 
response, perspectives on 
commercial sector, media 
Staff researcher Agricultural arm of foreign 
service delegation to Thailand 
International perspectives on 
HPAI control, trade 
implications of epidemic, 
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technical dimensions of 
epidemic 
Lobbyist/spokesperson Trade organization involved in 
government relations and 
promotion of poultry exports 
Restructuring of Thai poultry 
sector, impact of HPAI on 
poultry exporters, internal 
organization of trade org., 
relations with government 
and media 
President/spokesperson Lobbying group promoting 
cock-fighting in Thailand  
Structure of cock-fighting 
industry, support for cock-
fighting in rural areas, impact 
of gov. policies on cock-
fighters, role of lobbying 
group, mech. For expressing 
political dissent 
Former industry executive (by 
phone) 
Commercial poultry producer Impact of epidemic on Thai 
poultry exporters, responses 
to epidemic among large 
producers, relations with 
government and small 
producers 
Researcher, liaison to national 
bodies 
International body responsible 
for disease control and health 
promotion 
Role of MOPH in control of 
HPAI, role of int’l comm.. in 
advising/supporting Thai 
policies, Thailand’s role in 
regional disease control, role 
of  spec Thai gov. units  
Researcher, liaison Representative of foreign 
entity seconded to Thai gov. 
unit focusing on health 
Structure of bio-medical 
research in Thailand, role of 
int’l comm. in supporting & 
developing research capacity, 
influenza control 
Administrator, liaison to int’l 
health organizations 
Thai government entity 
responsible for disease 
control and prevention 
Background to development 
and promulgation of state 
health policies relating to 
HPAI, relations with int’l health 
community, role in regional 
health initiatives 
Field staff Government entity 
responsible for health 
promotion and treatment 
Activities undertaken at local 
level in support of HPAI 
education and control, local 
perceptions of HPAI, 
communication and training 
for MOPH staff 
University lecturer/researcher Public university (affiliated 
with research unit) 
Health promotion education 
related to HPAI and its control, 
coordination among gov 
ministries on HPAI control 
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Journalist (by phone) English-language Thai daily Major influences on gov 
policy-making, public 
perceptions of HPAI and gov 
policy, investigative reporting 
& censorship in Thailand, 
relations between media and 
gov/lobbyists 
Former duck farmer Self-employed Duck husbandry and health 
practices in rural Thailand, 
impact of HPAI and other 
diseases, relations with gov. 
animal health officers 
 
Ethnographic Field Research 
In two areas of information-gathering it became clear that research based solely on interviews 
would not supply an adequate understanding of events on the ground.  Both the complex sub-
culture of cock-fighting and duck-farming practices were insufficiently rendered by the oral 
accounts of informants, many of whom were themselves removed from the practices described.  
So, an attempt was made to supplement this information with direct field observation. 
 
In the case of cock-fighting a second complexity arose, namely the highly gendered nature of 
the sport which made many male respondents reluctant to speak in any detail with a female 
researcher.  After a series of abortive attempts to gather information directly, the author decided 
to enlist the support of an experienced Thai social scientist (male) who ventured into the field to 
conduct the interviews and observations on her behalf.  Over the course of three field visits to 
sites scattered throughout the rural North the researcher was able to speak to approximately 
fifteen informants, several of whom had spent many years involved with the training and 
breeding of fighting cocks and two of whom had even been employed by “professional” 
breeding farms.  There were also informants whose involvement with cock-fighting was more 
peripheral: attending fights and placing bets or in one instance, preparing food and selling it at 
fights. 
Plans were also laid to pay a visit to a government animal health field office and a duck-rearing 
operation, both located in an area which had been the site of a major outbreak two years before 
the schedule visit.  However, the visit was called off just a few days before it was to take place and 
it proved impossible to reschedule.  Consequently, an interview was carried out with the animal 
extension officer by phone and contact was made with a substitute informant who had been 
involved in rearing ducks but had left the business prior to the outbreak of HPAI. 
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